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Bu çalışmanın amacı fotoğrafın kimliği ve varlığı üzerine kapsamlı bir inceleme 
geliştirmektir. Bu amaç doğrultusunda, fotoğraf ve fotoğraflar hakkındaki kuramlar 
gözden geçirilmekte ve bu kuramların genellikle göz ardı ettiği bazı kavramlar öne 
sürülmektedir. Söz konusu kavramların geliştirilmesinde yazının ‘mantığı’ndan ve 
tarihsel olayın oluşundan yararlanılmış ve bu anlayışların fotoğraf alanına 
uygulanmasında fotoğrafın varhkbilimin söylemiyle olan ilişkisi temel alınmıştır. 
Böylece, fotoğrafın varlığını onu ‘belirli’ ortamlara kısıtlamak yoluyla yok sayan ve 
fotoğrafik zamanı ‘gerçek zaman’a bütünsel bir karşıtlık çerçevesinde ilişkilendiren 
önergelerin sorunsallaştırılması hedeflenmektedir.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Fotoğraf, Yazı, Gerçek, Hayalet, Tanıma, Yinelenebilirlik, Tarih, 
Roland Barthes.
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ABSTRACT
A REVIEW OF THE ‘ONTOLOGY’ OF PHOTOGRAPHY
Önder Sevimli 
M.F.A. in Graphic Design 
Supervisor: Assist. Prof. Dr. Mahmut Mutman 
September, 2004
This study is the culmination of a speculative attempt to understand and restate the 
enigma of photography. It aims to supplement the thought of photography with a host of 
concepts that seem to have escaped the scope of the theoretical critique of photography 
and photographs. In doing so, it follows the lead of the ‘logic’ of the grapheme and of 
the event of history to review the position of photography in relation to the language of 
the logic of being, and investigates whether the time of photography can be held in 
opposition to ‘real time.’ Consequently, the contexts in which contemporary thought on 
photography restrict the identity of photography are problematized, and the peculiarities 
involved in the interaction between photographs and viewers are emphasized in this 
study.
Keywords: Photography, Writing, the Real, Specter, Recognition, Iterability, History, 
Roland Barthes.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Once vision became located in 
the empirical immediacy of the 
observer’s body, it belonged to 
time, to flux, to death. The 
guarantees of authority, identity, 
and universality supplied by the 
camera obscura are of another 
epoch. (Crary 24)
We might say in another 
language that a criticism or a 
deconstruction of representation 
would remain feeble, vain, and 
irrelevant if it were to lead to 
some rehabilitation of 
immediacy, of original 
simplicity, of presence without 
repetition or delegation, if it were 
to induce a calculable objectivity, 
of criticism, of science, of 
technique, or of political 
representation. The worst 
regressions can put themselves at 
the service of this 
antirepresentative prejudice. 
(Derrida, “Sending: On
Representation” 311)
Only of writing as graph can it be 
said “that it perhaps does not 
exist.” It does not certainly have 
being as defined by the either-or- 
structure of ontological discourse 
(the language of the logic of 
being). (Spivak 89-90)
1.1 Scope of the Study
This study attempts to present an understanding of the experience of photography 
that would ‘differ’ from the conventional manners of thought that focus on 
conceptualizing the relationships between the subject and the photographic image. 
In doing so, although it does not render right-at-the-outset the name given to its 
subject more forceful and designate a photogra/?/2y, it cannot resist the temptation 
of bringing into its scope certain approaches that can be termed ‘post­
structuralist. ’ It takes its motivation, however, in particular from the work of 
Roland Barthes, and takes his studies on photography to constitute an especially 
challenging body of work. Although the essay at hand does not pretend to aim as 
nearly as high, it is undertaken in the belief that the directions with which Roland 
Barthes riddles in his work on photography can be carried over to ends that could 
alter the general frameworks of discussion wherein ‘the photograph’ is made the 
focus of considerate attention.
Since denying photography an identity-proper and a motivation to pursue a 
discursive agency definitive to it is central to an important vein of contemporary 
thought on photographs and other ‘forms of representation,’ the discussion 
undertaken here first and foremost puts modesty aside and engages in what could 
be considered a critique of some authoritative aspects of ‘the theory of 
photography.’ It does not, however, aim to breach open a current of emancipatory 
identity politics based on photographic image production or on viewing 
photographs. Neither does it pursue embracing certain practices involved, either in 
the form of ‘photographic movements or schools’ or institutions of spectatorship 
that would differ from other practices in terms of content, approach, or context.
On the other hand, it is undertaken in the belief that photographs markedly differ
from other visual material in terms of the distinct ways viewers relate to them and 
their mode of production. Although room is left for a consideration of ways in 
which different families of experience and affect can accompany different groups 
of photographs, the focus is put on the somewhat remote possibility of 
approaching a consideration proper to photography at large, rather than in 
particular to certain photographs. In that, the discussions put forth here invite 
comment that targets in them a certain form of ‘essentialism. ’ Why this ought not 
be the case, it is hoped, will be clearer as those discussions are put to motion, as 
‘intending’ to entertain such a position would be out of the question here.
The recognition that viewers (at least this one) do not mistake photographs 
for other ‘kinds’ of images unless they are ‘designed’ to mistake them at the 
outset lies at the center of this study. In fact, that viewers can be fooled into 
thinking that images that are produced through means alien to the ‘technology’ of 
photography is taken to be one evidence that something called “photography” 
indeed exists. Understanding that efforts to somehow prove that photography 
could only exist in a prosthetical relationship to discourse thus risk remaining 
solely technological (thus coming close in the last instance to asserting that 
something called photography had to be made up in an era of pre-industrial 
capitalism whereas in ‘reality’ it would really not exist), the arguments presented 
in this study are born out of a desire to review the ‘ontology’ of photography. In 
other, somewhat apologetic words, the title of this study serves to the extent of 
remembering that it is the ‘being’ of photography and photographs and the ‘mode 
of being’ that they problematize that are in question here. This calls, without 
doubt, to understand that photographs are governed by the (ill)logic of the written 
mark, in other words the ‘grapheme,’ and important parts of this study are devoted
to articulating this notion. These articulations could be seen to invite another vein 
of critical comments, since they could be taken to mean that the study under 
review differs from those that it aims to prove deconstructable only to a limited 
extent: ‘in criticizing certain approaches to photography under the term that they 
render photography a mere vehicle for what is above, behind and beyond itself, it 
sums photographs up as writing-nevertheless-in-the-general-sense.’ Although it 
tries to resist pretending to nullify those comments with the theoretical rigor it 
would have to demonstrate, it is hoped that this study would succeed in alluding 
to work and thought that concerns ‘writing’ with the formality it demands that 
such comments would remain operational.
In striving to manage what is neatly summed up in this introduction, this 
study cannot help but provoke more questions than it answers and raise more 
problems than it solves. It should be emphasized, however, that this is pretty much 
what it sets out to do in the first place. In other words, in asking ‘what 
photography is,’ the intention here is not to come up with a singular answer, but 
rather suggest ways in which the question can be more productively considered.
Taking Vicki Kirby’s suggestion that we should be critical of “postmodern 
correctives that regard the apparent evidence of nature as the actual representation 
of culture” as much as we are judicious of “an empiricism that perceives data as 
the raw and unmediated nature of the world” (2) seriously, the thoughts that are to 
follow strive to resist reducing photography either to the realm of light or to that 
of writing. Neither is a third term that would aim at effacing the differences under 
a single, anagrammatic title, such as the writing-of-light or the light-of-writing, is 
entertained, although discussions that do so are not considered any-more futile 
than the arguments advanced here or through the ‘postmodern critique of
photography. ’ What is taken to be more important concerns rather the conceptual 
approaches the theory of writing can help introduce to the theory of photography. 
In that, this study should be considered less as an alternative than a supplement to 
what it aims to hold under scrutiny. And it is in trying to follow the ‘logic’ of the 
latter that it has to go to places where it could be believed at first sight to be 
outside its boundaries.
The question of what photography is does not find its answer in this study 
anymore than it finds an answer that would invite submission without restitution 
in other studies on photography. It is the question and the asking, however, that 
turns out to be more productive than any possibility of a definitive answer. 
Answers of the ‘final’ type seem to be caught up in a naivete that this study tries 
to go around by means of a comparative conflation. The two major consequences 
of such naivete that is hoped to uncover as a result of the banally quick 
reproductions that are about to follow can be understood, however, to ultimately 
collapse on each other when it comes to photography’s identity. John Tagg, for 
example, finds that identity and its origins, agreeably, in political economy. For 
him, “[pjhotography is a mode of production consuming raw materials, refining 
its instruments, reproducing the skills and submissiveness of its labour force, and 
pouring on to the market a prodigious quantity of commodities” (“Currency of the 
Photograph” 123). Graham Clarke, on the other hand, setting out to isolate the 
photograph, has it that “[i]t is ... a doorway on to a world waiting to be recorded; 
but, like the world through which we move, it seems almost neutral in its 
structures of meaning” (11). What this catastrophic juxtaposition bears to mind 
has something to do with the way photography is ‘neutralized,’ constantly taken 
out of itself, regardless of whether the ‘world’ it is taken to thrive in is presumed
to be strictly constructed or utterly undivided. ‘Take photography out of the 
equation,’ it can be heard at the margins of these arguments, ‘and the world will 
go on turning in the same direction as it always did. ’ Indeed, if we were to replace 
the word photography from the above quotations and change it with the name of 
another mode of production or reproduction, nothing, it seems, would be lost in 
terms of the arguments’ internal coherence. An attempt at a demonstration, 
however, that the word proves irreplaceable because of the very fact that it is 
constantly replaced and replaces will be taken to be inescapable in the following 
pages.
This study takes off from a belief that ‘faith’ in photography and 
amazement in the name of photographs that its writer shares cannot be left to the 
intentions of either regional psychoanalytics or all-inclusive-linguistics alone. It 
takes the notions these approaches advance as given, but not as unproblematically 
in place. Therefore it tries to bring into play a host of concepts that are not strictly 
alien to these disciplines but somewhat veiled in them. In other words, in 
supplementing approaches that find photographs to be ultimately and strictly 
indispensable to the contexts in which they are located, it tries to resist taking 
recourse to the installation of a perfect formal essence for photography. It would, 
on the other hand, be equally superficial to argue that it does not have anything to 
do with the terms ‘modernist formalism’ (in other words, the institutional 
discourse of art) considers itself responsible for articulating. It insists, however, 
that if those terms, like, for example, ‘the artist,’ are to be problematized, they 
should be taken under consideration as elements that are productive as well as 
produced, acting even while acted upon. Indeed, it tries to encourage the study of
photography to emphasize the irreducibilities that similar oppositions contain but 
that cannot be simply restrained.
1.1 Chapters in Brief
The second chapter, “On Photography as Such,” aims to provide a review of 
certain compelling accounts of the very presence and effectiveness of 
photography within and for contemporary subjective, cultural, and political 
experiences. The two thinkers that receive most of the attention in this review are 
Victor Burgin and John Tagg, whose accounts of the mechanics involved in the 
‘uses’ of photography seem to have been very prominent and influential for the 
thought on photography. My intention in attempting to present such a review is by 
no means to restrict the many theories and ideas that the quite dispersed realm of 
contemporary criticism on photography puts forward to the lines of discussion 
presented by the small circle of thinkers that are to be speculated on here. Neither 
is it to overlook the numerous differences that can be spotted and that certainly 
could amount to deeper theoretical discrepancies in these particular articulations 
of photography. However, it appears that some of the culminations and residues of 
the general trajectory that (so-called) postmodernist thinking on photography 
draws can be located in these accounts that thus seem to have pursued it with 
rigor. The disadvantages and advantages for an agreeable reasoning on 
photography involved in this vein of thought, then, it is hoped, can be made 
apparent through an inspection of the discursive productions that motivate and 
animate these accounts. (Speaking of motivations: this of course is not the place to 
undertake a critical investigation of any detail of the motivations and theoretical 
influences or invocations that seem to have fed the writings of Burgin and Tagg,
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or any other thinker whose suggestions shall be alluded to in this review. Let it 
suffice for the moment to mention that specific blends of various theoretical 
penetrations that include but are not limited to psychoanalytic, structuralist, and 
Marxist gestures figure as important paths of development in these thinkers’ 
approaches).
It should be bom in mind that although Burgin and Tagg (as well as many 
other prominent thinkers) are very critical of the ways in which photography can 
be told to operate, especially in relation to the category of the subject and of 
subjectivity, their accounts can by no means be understood to negate photography 
or its ‘subject(s).’ In other words, they are not instances of an exercise in an ‘anti- 
photographical’ rhetoric, in any simple way. However, as it will be alluded to 
more often than not in the next few pages, the arguments they put forward can be 
understood to be determined by a declared intention to displace the notion that a 
fmitful discussion of photography (or photographs, for that matter) can be 
delineated through a recourse to the consideration of what is or are understood to 
be peculiar to it. In other words, it could perhaps be maintained that the attribution 
of an identity to photography, at least one that can be productively traced, is 
ceaselessly denied in these ‘postmodern’ approaches.
The interest this study has in putting the assumptions the postmodern 
critique of photography under scrutiny, even as it takes its findings as given, 
concerns the latter’s reluctance in acknowledging the apparent dispersion the 
origin of every photograph introduces into accounts that would restrict it to either 
the domain of nature or to that of culture. Anxious to demonstrate that nature is 
cultural and historical, such accounts seem quick to turn the said binary over, 
without, however, paying much attention to the remains such an action extracts of
the natural. In other words, they risk privileging certain, presumably more natural 
and more real states of being to which the human-condition-in-general denies 
access over others. Photography, therefore, sometimes inadvertently but mostly 
within acknowledgement, is posited as an impenetrable boundary between its 
products and the body, the real, and other immutable, essential forms of being that 
somehow manage to escape an inter-relative relation with history and culture.
Two particular approaches that are intermingled in these arguments are worth 
noting in this regard. An irreducibly psychoanalytic understanding of desire as a 
perpetual repression of and substitution for lack or loss; and an irreducibly 
technological understanding of the origin and place of photography in society and 
history as a response to the demand of repressive institutions: that is, as an ideal 
necessity of the demands of evolutionary history. These approaches, 
consequently, do not leave much space for discussion of photography and 
photographs as positively empowered agents, and restrictedly revolve around 
questions that concern the exactitude shown by repressive institutions in simply 
vehiculating them to their own ends. The outcome is a body of work of 
considerable efficiency that forgets some of the most radical findings of 
deconstruction in the name of evoking its name, most notably that the “fact that a 
unitary message about a unitary object from a unitary author to a unitary reader is 
what writing calls into question” (Spivak 94-5).
The third chapter, “Photography as a Mode of Spectral Writing,” is the 
testimony of an attempt to operate the thought of photography at the very heart of 
the oppositions its argument traces in the preceding. Its effort has less to do with 
reversing the opposition between culture and nature that it takes to occupy the 
heart of photography than approaching this duality as a productive maintenance.
The discussions advanced in this chapter aim to introduce through the theory of 
writing and technological reproducibility certain concepts such as ‘recognition,’ 
‘iterability,’ and ‘specter’ to the framework of thought on photography. The 
relationship of photographs and signs in general with matter, body, and reality are 
therefore destined to be problematized yet once again, without, however, 
necessarily positing definitive ends to those relationships. What photography 
means for and ‘does’ to the perception and the being of the subject are brought 
into fore-view as irrefutably necessary themes of critique, and, consequently, a 
different way of approaching the relationships of the subject, nature, culture, and 
history with photography and with each other is meant to be nurtured. Certain 
concepts, like spacing and absence, are also honored in the name of the 
photograph as irreducible, structural counterparts of the process of photographic 
‘communication,’ as of any process of meaning-making in general.
The fourth and last chapter, “Conclusion: Photography and History,” 
attempts to take issue with certain arguments that are presently at the forefront of 
thought on photography and that seem to announce the death of photography, 
chronological with the advent of digital technologies. Prior to doing so, however, 
the discussion advanced in this chapter attempts to take issue with the aftermath 
of the web of arguments developed in the preceding chapter. In that, the critique 
introduced in the second chapter is brought together with the notions posited in 
the third chapter in order to be able to fully explicate the dimensions of 
photography’s relationships with history, writing, and time. In maintaining that 
the concept of history “corresponds to what happens during the photographic 
event -  to what happens when an image comes to pass” (Cadava 234-5) and to the 
visitation of the specter, the discussion presented here aims to suggest that
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photography can be understood as a productively viable field of writing and 
reading for the concernQà viewer. On the other hand, in granting that the notion of 
death occupies the very heart of the photograph, this chapter also aims to question 
the susceptibility of those arguments which maintain that digital technologies 
destroy the truth-producing capabilities of the photograph on the basis of the 
former’s capabilities to alter the appearance of ‘objects’ in ways that are alien to 
the photograph. Taking this capacity to be have been an option in photography 
since its inception, however, what those technologies alter in the photograph are 
taken in this discussion to disturb, by taking to an extreme, its discourse of the 
necessary absence or interrupted presence of its referent. In other words, while the 
discussion here is complicit with accounts that maintain that photography-as-we- 
know is at stake in the age of its digital reproducibility and manipulation, it also 
supplements those accounts with the question of whether it has not always been at 
stake.
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2 ON PHOTOGRAPHY AS SUCH
It is precisely because the photograph is an 
anthropologically new object that it must 
escape, it seems to me, usual discussions of the 
image. It is the fashion, nowadays, among 
Photography’s commentators (sociologists and 
semiologists), to seize upon a semantic 
relativity: no “reality” (great scorn for the 
“realists” who do not see that the photograph is 
always coded), nothing but artifice: Thesis, not 
Physis·, the Photograph, they say, is not an 
analogon of the world; what is represents is 
fabricated, because the photographic object is 
subject to Albertian perspective (entirely 
historical) and because the inscription on the 
picture makes a three-dimensional object into a 
two-dimensional effigy. This argument is futile 
... The realists, of whom I am one ... do not 
take the photograph for a “copy” of reality, but 
for an emanation of past reality, a magic, not an 
art. To ask whether a photograph is analogical 
or coded is not a good means of analysis. The 
important thing is that the photograph possesses 
an evidential force, and that its testimony bears 
not on the object but on time. ... in the 
Photograph, the power of authentication exceeds 
the power of representation. (Barhes, Camera 
Lucida: Reflections on Photography [hereafter 
Camera Lucida\ 88-9)
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2.1 Notes on Why Photographs do not Matter
The three key articles by Victor Burgin that will be discussed in connection to 
each other in this and the following section are “Photographic Practice and Art 
Theory,” “Looking at Photographs,” and “Photography, Phantasy, Function.” The 
arguments raised through them tend to revolve for most of the time and in a 
particular way around questions of subjectivity, technique, authorship, 
spectatorship, and modernism (read: modernist formalism), and will be 
understood and shown to project a specific understanding of photography.
In “Photographic Practice and Art Theory” (hereafter “Photographic 
Practice”), Burgin begins to undertake his discussion of the specific viewing and 
social experiences that photography invites in situating these experiences within 
larger frameworks that are nevertheless accountable in general terms, or, more 
appropriately, in terms of a critical delineation of the key moments of the 
discourses that are understood to overwhelm such experiences. Burgin announces 
an interest first and foremost in deconstructing the boundaries on which the 
habitual agendas that inform modernist discussions of photography come to a 
definitive limit. The arguments advanced by modernist formalism, by positing 
transcendental subjects at both ends of the photographic production of meaning 
(that will later be shown by Burgin to inevitably collapse onto each other), tend to 
occupy a significantly silent position on questions that involve the social aspects 
of the production and viewing of photographs. Burgin relates these accounts of 
photographic criticism, which he maintains assume that photography is defined by 
a relation of transparence to the presence of a referent or ‘truth,’ to an impossible 
yet logocentric (and ultimately nostalgic) yearning that fantasizes of immediacy in 
the name of representation. In other words, of an ‘immediate medium.’ He
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contends that the “great majority of writers on photography” are prone to an age 
old ‘“window-on-the-world’ realism,” and are thus expressive of “this logocentric 
longing” (Bürgin, “Photographic Practice” 55). In evoking Walter Benjamin’s 
conceptualization of photography, Bürgin finds the “fetishistic and anti-technical” 
(“Photographic Practice” 40) stance Benjamin locates in the discourse of early 
theorists of photography very much at work within contemporary thought on art 
and photography.^ Declaring that his starting point can therefore be understood to 
be borne out of a desire to operate against these anti-technical notions, Bürgin 
goes on to elaborate his ‘anti-fetishistic and technical’ position in the face of 
common discourses that surround the production of meaning, paying attention to 
the social as well as technical aspects by which photographs can be said to come 
to mean or ‘work.’
In exemplifying a certain level of congruence with academic approaches 
leading in the time period in which he is writing^, Bürgin devotes much of his 
efforts to convincingly articulating that, in photography as in any other mode of 
textual production, meaning is actively produced rather than merely found in a 
locked-up cabinet in which it is to be carried away from the scene, stage or 
whatever pro-filmic event or space wherein the photographer -  or, in his words, 
the “photographic opportunist” (“Photographic Practice” 40) -  locates, while he is 
‘finger on the button,’ ‘the truth’ or some aspect thereof. The photographer, 
according to Bürgin, subsequently involves in a second act of positioning when he 
or she takes a picture of this newly-found-truth and disseminates it. This second
 ^Benjamin details this anti-technical and fetishistic understanding, which operated for many 
decades “widiout achieving the slightest of results,” as he puts it, in “A Small History of 
Photography.”
 ^See “Diderot, Barthes, Vertigo,” particularly p. 85: “It is partly in response to this lacuna of 
theory [:formalism] that, in recent years, a psychoanalytically informed semiotics has been 
evolved.”
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act of location is itself inevitably located in discourse, or in Burgin’s 
understanding of discursive production, within language. This is not, however, to 
suggest that the ‘positionary’ act with which the photographer operates his part in 
the construction of meaning is to be discovered in a form relatively unbound of 
discourse, language, or ideology if it is investigated when it can be understood to 
be at the first order of its development. The issue of the selection and discretion of 
what to count as framed by the viewfinder and what not ‘speaks’ in and of itself of 
the particular social, cultural, political, and ideological moment wherein the 
photographer -  who, as the producer of meaning, is never really reducible to the 
person who releases the shutter of the camera per se -  is enmeshed. Burgin 
continues his discussion on the premise that the out-there, the pro-photographic, is 
always already encoded, although not necessarily in a photographic way. Put 
more appropriately, each and every thing occupies first and foremost a place in 
the categorically superior system of exchange-value to which it cannot but belong 
to, and which therefore pre-determines the set of meanings its existence or 
allusions (like photography) to its existence will be governed by. Certainly, the 
specifics of the relations they have with other objects things-out-there constitute 
and are constituted by can be subject to change, but the fact that these 
relationships of meaning are always already constituted, or rendered meaningful 
prior to their occupation in the general web of relations is absolute.
Photography no doubt has to do with things out there, “it is these ‘things’ 
which photography provides pictures of,” however, “things are never simply 
things to us” (Burgin, “Photographic Practice” 45). They are never ‘without’
 ^While the very act selection, of dominating the viewfinder, appears at first to confine the 
production of meaning in photography to the photographer’s ‘performance,’ Burgin will show 
effectively that the camera’s viewfinder is far from being the only one in photography. Rather, a
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meaning, as it were. Furthermore, the category of meaning, although it is 
subjected to the effects of the existence of these ‘things,’ can also be said to 
presuppose them: “[i]n the very moment of their being perceived, objects are 
placed within an intelligible system of relationships. [...] They take their position, 
that is to say, within an ideology'^ (Burgin, “Photographic Practice” 45-6). This 
systematic occupation, certainly, is one that ensures the stabilization of meanings 
and systems of meaning making. Photography, then, can be understood to perform 
as serene as “one signifying system among others in society which produces the 
ideological subject in the same movement in which they ‘communicate’ their 
ostensible ‘contents’” (Burgin, “Looking at Photographs” 153). In other words, 
seeing is never neutral, and ‘neutral visions’ turn out eventually to be as governed 
by codes or culture as those that are more noticeably ‘artificial’''.
In order for it to be capable of operating in the harmonious manner that it 
is taken to operate, it is necessary that ideology take “an infinite variety of forms” 
(Burgin, “Photographic Practice” 46), of which photographs are only a category -  
or even ‘lesser,’ only instances, so to speak, for they cannot be said to be 
categorical. Since photography and photographs are simply instances of those 
forms and because “[f]orms of artifacts, [which] as much as forms of language, 
serve to communicate ideologies” (Burgin, “Photographic Practice” 46), and are 
restricted restrictions as such, photography cannot but claim an existence per se. 
More appropriately, it does not or cannot in any sense pursue an agency of its
much more powerful but no less technical viewfinder that goes by the name of ‘fetishism’ 
overrides the photographic procedure in his view.
'' See on this point Eco, “Critique of the Image,” an article Burgin has reason to turn to frequently. 
Eco goes on in this piece to articulate many sets and categories of codes that can be understood to 
govern seeing even in its most primal, or primitive, sense. Victor Burgin elaborates the ways by 
which seeing should be understood as an interdisciplinary register further in “Seeing Sense,” 
where he affirms efforts that aim “to provide a corrective to the naïve idea of purely retinal 
vision” (53).
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own. Because ideology appropriates, re-appropriates or incorporates each and 
every thing and form through an invisibly instantaneous, indivisible action, then 
those things and forms -  of which photography is but one example -  cannot be 
expected to retain much of a definitive identity. Furthermore, and for the same 
reasons, photography cannot be allocated a privileged place in the production of 
meaning either, even (or especially) when the image in question is not peculiar to 
a certain context, i.e. a piece of writing, or caption. “Objects present to the camera 
are already in use in the production of meanings, and photography has no choice 
but to operate upon such meanings” (Bürgin, “Photographic Practice” 47). 
Therefore, neither the ‘photographic genius’ or ‘talent’ the artist-seer operates on 
a claim of possession of, nor “the lucky snapping of a ‘moment of truth’” (Bürgin, 
“Photographic Practice” 41) on the side of the amateur-realist could be taken to 
penetrate beyond appearances that are always already just that -  appearances, 
even if it were possible to erect such typologies in an unproblematic way. On the 
other hand, Burgin’s relentless efforts to demonstrate the uneasy assumptions that 
motivate modernist discourses -  discourses that are constrained by a curious 
attempt at defending ‘art photography’ and the artist, for example -  can be taken 
to hint at the efficacy of an unsuspecting attitude towards theories of 
representation and of the ‘media’ in the ways in which Bürgin demarcates his 
arguments. In other words, at an alliance with the lineage of an epoch within 
which
reading and writing, the production and interpretation of signs, the 
text in general as fabric of signs, allow themselves to be confined 
within secondariness. They are preceded by a truth, or a meaning 
already constituted by and within the element of the logos. Even 
when the thing, the “referent,” is not immediately related to the 
logos of a creator God where it began by being the spoken/thought 
sense, the signified has at any rate an immediate relationship with 
the logos in general (finite or infinite), and a mediated one with the
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signifier, that is to say with the exteriority of writing. (Derrida, O f
Grammatology 15)
Before we can start to outline the framework through which Burgin’s structuralist 
assumptions can be understood to overwhelm the deconstructionist practice he 
aims at undertaking, let us pause to attend in further detail to the notion of truth- 
production he delineates. According to Bürgin, photography, and in particular so- 
called ‘straight photography’ ,^ has to invariably ‘hunt’ for truth ‘out there,’ and 
despite all the inoperability involved in such an endeavor, has to find it, too. 
Contrary to what an unreflecting notion of representation might suggest to be the 
‘medium’s eternal cause and territory of conquest, photography ‘in itself is 
theorized by Bürgin to be unproductive in locating and grasping truth. That is, 
without being accompanied by an eye to the very operation of truth-production 
they are always already caught in the process of performing, photographers are at 
best similar to dogs of prey (and under the service of their masters, of course). 
Bürgin puts it in an eloquent way: “It seems to be extensively believed by 
photographers that meanings are to be found in the world much in the way that 
rabbits are found on downs, and all that is required is the talent to spot them and 
the skill to shoot them” (“Photographic Practice” 40). There are ways out of this 
vicious circle of compromises, and Bürgin eventually takes the liberty of hinting 
at them, although cautiously. Before we can take note of those ways, however, the 
processes by which Bürgin argues that truth/truths-not-necessarily-photographic 
produced shall be dealt with more extensively.
 ^This term has traditionally denoted a mode of production that values the effacement of any 
modifications by the photographer himself or herself either to the ‘scene’ to be photographed or to 
the resulting negative and/or print whatsoever. As problematic as it might be, it continues to 
dominate the code of practice by which a large -  if not the largest -  part of photography that is 
produced today abides by. It should suffice at this moment to note that Burgin’s criticism, it 
seems, should be imderstood to extend to the dimensions of the dissemination of that code as well.
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Victor Burgin’s assertions in “Photographie Practice and Art Theory” 
seem to be constrained and expanded by the necessity to downplay first and 
foremost the notion that truth is to be found on the street -  that is, ‘out there’ -  
waiting to be revealed, however, by the singular click of the still camera’s shutter. 
The problems he locates in such an understanding of photographic (as well as 
other ‘means’ of) image production relates less to the very common place notion 
that images are not to be relied on -  i.e. they are ‘deceptive,’ etc. -  than an act of 
taking issue with an uncritical acceptance of truth(s) thus produced. Hence, 
appearances are deprived of the power to produce truth, but no more can ‘things 
themselves’ be immune to the procedures by which images are made to produce 
meaning: procedures that can be grouped under the headline of ideology. Contrary 
to what appears at first sight, it seems that Burgin is operating here less in a 
framework governed by the binaries of truth/illusion or
presentation/representation (a framework that is borne every time and again the 
word ideology is uttered) than in one that values combating any stable notion of 
truth and meaning, although the said binaries and other such pairs of relevance 
have a definitive importance for his discussion, as I shall attempt to demonstrate 
later. Meaning in photography is always already produced through acts of 
recourse to texts other than the particular photograph in question and which are no 
less central to the process by which meaning is generated as the photograph 
‘itself’ Certainly, the latter has, by consequence, to assume a very slippery 
position from which to involve in this practice. Hence, photographs communicate 
in an almost entirely syntagmatic manner, always in relation to other photographs 
and texts of other persuasions as well as ideas and ideologies, whether or not the
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‘second’ (or ‘sub’) text/texts crudely coexist with, that is, be ‘present’ at the time
of the ‘reading’ of the photograph. Their meanings ultimately depend
rather on our common knowledge of the typical representation of 
prevailing social facts and values: that is to say, on our knowledge 
o f the way objects transmit and transform ideology, and the ways 
in which photographs in their turn transform these. To appreciate 
such operations we must first lose any illusion about the neutrality 
of objects before the camera. (Bürgin, “Photographic Practice” 41. 
Emphasis added.)
The fact that Bürgin dismisses at once understandings of photography that depend
on a certain notion of processes of communication that emphasizes the supposed
neutrality of channels of meaning and approaches that ascribe an intrinsic
integrity to ‘messages’ seems to demand attention. In other words, the apparent
incongruity involved in the dual movement that Bürgin details seem to stem from
a more fundamental dispersion. Photography capitalizes on meanings already
being made, ideologies that have been already installed in place. However, it
somehow manages to further transform these archaic deployments, the petrified
nature of which Bürgin had to assure us a priori. It is tempting, therefore, to
acknowledge the very correspondence the reluctance to negotiate an active,
constituting site for photography in the production of meaning that runs through
Burgin’s assertions as a backdrop with a Sausserean relegation of writing. In O f
Grammatology, Jacques Derrida puts this act of downgrading at the very heart of
the notion of an uncontested sign, and does so succinctly:
The written signifier is always technical and representative. It has 
no constitutive meaning. This derivation is the very origin of the 
notion of the “signifier.” The notion of the sign always implies 
within itself the distinction between signifier and signified, even if, 
as Saussure argues, they are distinguished simply as the two faces 
of one and the same leaf. (11)
20
The problems that such a correspondence can be understood to invite emerge in
further development in a later passage in “Photographic Practice and Art Theory:”
In an ingenuous assumption the photograph is held to reproduce its 
object. However, the relationship between a photographic image 
and its referent is one of reproduction only to the extent that 
Christopher Wren’s death-mask reproduces Christopher Wren. The 
photograph abstracts from, and mediates, the actual. For example, 
a photograph of three people grouped together may, in reality, have 
comprised a live model, a two-dimensional ‘cut-out’ figure, and a 
wax dummy. In the actual presence of such an assembly I would 
quickly know them for what they were. No such certainty 
accompanies my cognition of the photographic group. It is 
precisely the difference between our comprehension of an object 
and our comprehension of its image. (Bürgin 61-2)^
Suddenly, it appears that photography is at its core a system of mediation, and a 
corrupt one at that. What exactly could the “difference” Bürgin is anxious to 
emphasize be constituted of? The difference, that is, between presentation and 
representation; a difference that Bürgin spent many suggestive assertions to assure 
us did not hold up, the assertion that things are never present to subjects in an 
unproblematic sense being at the center of those assertions. The difference Bürgin 
has in mind, then, can be taken to comprise in its nucleus a fundamental one: that 
between truth and illusion per se. “In the actual presence,” of things proper Bürgin 
would know them ‘Tor what they were;” but faced with their presence in the 
photographic space that brings the automaton with the living and that counters 
‘reality,’ he cannot quite be sure. In the process of evoking such an opposition, 
such a difference or the difference-as-such, then, certain aspects of Burgin’s
* The hostility toward ‘staging’ in photography, or, more appropriately, of the staging of the 
referent in photography, here emergent in the examples of the wax dummy and the two- 
dimensional cut-out figure, can be traced back on a certain level to that most anxious early critique 
of photography, Charles Baudelaire. See particularly Baudelaire, Charles, “The Salon of 1859.” 
Phillippe Lacoue-Labarthe aptly demonstrates that Baudelaire’s ultimate problem with 
photography, which Burgin seems to share, at least in this particular excerpt, has to do with the 
theatricality involved. In other words, that what the presence of photographs puts in danger is the 
integrity of the referent rather than of visual communication (i.e. persons becoming cut-out 
figures). See Lacoue-Labarthe.
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arguments can be followed to invite dangerous lines of an analytical act that 
would, for instance, look for in photographs for ‘signs’ of intervention: the signs, 
that is, through an evolution of which photographs can be understood to become 
coded utterances and photography a language, or, better still, linguistic. Bürgin’s 
next task is to go on to attempt at helping it to emerge that analogical ‘means of 
representation’ should be understood as being as coded as digital ones. Those 
codes of ‘natural’ perception are merely invoked by the iconic image rather than 
do exist in the presence of it. In other words, the iconic image simply renders 
present a system of signs that are associated in the mind of the subject with those 
of ‘real presence,’ with which the representational system at work is not to be 
confused. Bürgin does not, however, entertain even in the very least the uncanny 
directions the recognition that the codes that are supposed to govern photographic 
representations are very similar, at least in experience, to those that are understood 
to regulate ‘presentation.’
A certain, very definitive trace of an overwhelming tradition of thought on 
visual communication, therefore, can be spotted to run through at least some 
aspects of Victor Burgin’s arguments, as the paragraph cited above makes 
evident. The distinction that Bürgin raises between the referent and the 
photograph, it turns out, is one that occupies the very heart of the structuralist 
controversy -  a controversy Bürgin wows in his early writing to take issue with in 
the near future. We suddenly remember the archaic opposition which Ferdinand 
de Saussure devotes much effort to sustain in his Course in General Linguistics·. 
that of speech versus writing. Saussure goes as far as to compare the relations 
between the two hands of this notorious duality to the opposition between the 
thing photographed and the photograph, the respective locations of the terms in
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the hierarchy being assuredly perpetuated (17). This binary framework toils to 
maintain first and foremost the primacy of the spoken word, of the truth of the 
spoken word; and the illusory nature of the written word, of the inability of the 
written word to produce meaning in that it operates through mimesis: in short, of 
the proximity of the truth to the subject when the subject is proximate to the word, 
or, put exactly, the metaphysics of presence. In such an economy, “[a]s has been 
more or less implicitly determined, the essence of the phone would be 
immediately proximate to that which within ‘thought’ as logos relates to 
“meaning,” produces it, receives it, speaks it, ‘composes’ it” (Derrida, O f 
Grammatology 11). It should perhaps be spelled out at this moment that the 
deadly secondariness, the ill-laden alterity that occupies the space of writing -  
contrary to speech, of which it merely is a meager copy -  defines for Bürgin also 
the space of the photograph. The confusion of the one for the other should no 
doubt give birth to unholy results, of which ‘illusion’ is one but a minor instance. 
The cut-out figure and the wax dummy come to invite comparison with the human 
being, and the photograph is confused with the referent in much the same way as 
maps are confused with territories and representations are equated with 
presentations. The particular problem that bespeaks the photograph, however -  
that it puts into danger the very dimensions that restrain such relations -  is what 
Bürgin does not seem to desire to investigate, but prefer to leave to 
psychoanalytics-proper. In other words, the subject is as grounded in ‘reality’ as 
to evade confusing the map with the territory, but suffers such ‘madness,’ the 
madness of taking writing to be speech, when faced with photographs. A case in 
point is that the territory is assumed to be always already present to the subject in 
some supposedly ‘pure’ form: in Burgin’s words, the subject could devolve “[i]n
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the actual presence” of it and “would quickly know” it for what is (“Photographic 
Practice” 61-62). What Bürgin leaves untheorized is that the ‘actual,’ ‘real’ 
territory of the photograph, on the other hand, is apparently no more available in 
any other figure at the viewing of or in the presence of the photograph: it cannot 
be grasped in any form except the photographic. In addition, photography can be 
understood to act mute in terms of its roots when it is compared with other 
photographic systems of representation: while the ‘reality test’ operated in the 
manner of ‘sticking one’s hand in front of the projector’’ rescues the cinematic 
form of reference from such confusions, the surface of the photograph bruises the 
hand that aims to reach out and through. It is thus that the photograph can be 
understood to complicate the binary logic that governs the difference.
Bürgin therefore has to breach the politics of denial he inaugurated earlier 
and inaugurates elsewhere, and grant photography an identity, however illicit. In 
the process of downplaying the illusions it advances against truths proper, he 
seems to feel the necessity to ascribe photography a privileged (although 
illegitimate) position among systems of representation that he argued served 
ideology equivocally. He can be understood, more importantly, to appear to 
exemplify an uncritical stance towards the condemnation of writing as an ill- 
founded ground for the play of signification, with photography claiming almost 
the place of the most perverse form of writing. In that, Burgin’s arguments can be 
maintained to display an alignment, however accidental or superficial, with the 
preoccupations of the dimensions of the logocentric longing he claims to operate 
against, and which “would thus support the determination of the being of the 
entity as presence” (Derrida, O f Grammatology 12), and presence only. The
’ This expression is borrowed from Martin Jay.
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difference between the sensible and the intelligible Burgin erects in the example
of the wax-dummy who threatens to come to life through the photographic print
has profound implications indeed: the totality of the semiotic or linguistic register
cannot take hold without it. As Derrida puts it,
[t]he semiological or, more specifically, linguistic “science” cannot 
therefore hold on to the difference between signifier and signified 
-  the very idea of the sign -  without the difference between 
sensible and intelligible, certainly, but also not without retaining, 
more profoundly and more implicitly, and by the same token the 
reference to a signified able to “takeplace” in its intelligibility, 
before its “fall, ” before any expulsion into the exteriority o f the 
sensible here below. (Of Grammatology 13. Emphasis added.)
In trying to detail the ways in which Burgin’s arguments can be 
understood to be informed by an implicit disinclination to writing -  here, 
photography -  as a constitutive or primary system, my intention is not to perform 
a revelatory act of spotting out the ‘metaphysics of presence’ involved. It is rather 
an attempt at articulating the disadvantages that can blemish the ways we have 
come to think about photography and that seem to emerge most powerfully when 
photography is considered within the confines of oppositions like 
presentation/representation and truth/illusion solely. Of course, as Derrida is quick 
to add, it is not a question of “rejecting” these notions; they are necessary and, at 
least at present, nothing is conceivable for us without them” (Of Grammatology 
13).
In setting down the extensions of the oppositions he raised, Victor Burgin
takes a turn to assure us that the said binaries are deployed not as rigidly as the
critique of representation he thus installed might suggest. He notes that
[rjeceived habits of thought have accustomed us to oppose the 
schematic to the non-schematic. On closer consideration, however, 
we may recognise these two states as highly theoretical, the ideal 
antipodes of a unified world. We should more realistically speak
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degrees of schématisation, or iconicity of signs. (“Photographic 
Practice” 65)
Contrary to what appears at first sight, Burgin’s suggestion that we should
understand all signs to be essentially iconic and arbitrary at the same time,
distributed along the two said poles (the photographic being the closest to the
iconic), falls short of hinting at a retrieval of his arguments from the moderation
of the ‘logocentric longing’ he condemns. Rather, the argument seems to promote
forgetting off ‘the real’ all-together, and thus denies any kind of access to it
particularly when writing-in-the-form-of-photography is in question, since the
photographic sign, or more properly the written sign, cannot get away without
falling first under the handicap of schematization. “[T]he dots of a half-tone
block, the apparent lines of a TV image” are dismissed as only secondarily related
to the “high iconicity of ‘photography proper,”’ (Burgin, “Photographic Practice”
65) which itself is only derivative of a code already in place, almost in ‘presence:’
The photograph, however, is not innocent of arbitrariness for its 
being in a more directly causal and apparently unmediated 
relationship to its referent, because the interaction between the 
photographic emulsion and the light reflected from the object is 
selectively controlled. [...] These carry the optional variants which 
are equivalent to the prosodic features of natural language [: 
language proper]. A photograph, for example, may exhibit ‘hard’ 
or ‘soft’ focus, large or small grain, and thus carry such 
connotational oppositions as masculine/feminine. (Burgin,
“Photographic Practice” 65. Emphasis added.)
2.2 Different Photographs/Differing Photographies
The inferiority of photographic meaning, of photographic discourse against the 
discourses beyond itself it has to engage, is thus settled. The texts and discourses 
that make photographs possible, that precede photography in too many senses of 
the word, “[tjhese prior texts, those presupposed by the photograph, are
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autonomous; they serve a role in the actual text but do not appear in it, they are 
latent to the manifest text and may only be read across it ‘symptomatically’” 
(Bürgin, “Looking at Photographs” 144). A new definition for what photographs 
are that turns out to be at least as old as photography, then: warning signs of the 
intoxications of ideology. A locatable author in photography, therefore, becomes a 
necessary ingredient, and the rhetoric of ‘the message’ a must. The lineage 
Burgin’s arguments raise up pre-requires that any arrangement of dialogue on and 
with photography involve the tenet of intention, that “whatever specificity might 
be attributed to photography at the level of the ‘image’ is inextricably caught up 
within the specificity o f the social acts which intend that image and its meaning" 
(144. Emphasis added), as Bürgin notes in “Looking at Photographs.”
Pausing for a moment, we may note that Burgin’s style of stabbing to let 
the ghosts of structuralism and the oppositions that sustain it go their own way 
involves a summoning forth of the ghosts of psychoanalysis, more particularly 
that of the psychoanalytic subject. Earlier, Bürgin outlined photography and the 
photograph against common wisdom and staged it so that photographs cannot be 
said to refer to any (‘actual’) thing (‘out there’), at least not in an unproblematic 
way, but only to other signifying systems and significations. In other words, his 
take on photography or photographic communication has demanded that the ‘in 
itself of the photograph and of photography is questioned vigorously and that this 
questioning be made the primary task of critique. Bürgin spells out his position 
most explicitly in another article -  one which embodies a certain attempt at 
incorporating Roland Barthes’s thought on photography within a 
psychoanalytically driven agenda, where he states that “[mjeaning is never simply 
‘there’ for our consumption, it is only ever produced in a process of substitution
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of one term for another in a potentially limitless series” (“Diderot, Barthes, 
Vertigo” 85). The particular take on the ‘differential’ equation or understanding of 
the production of meaning Bürgin puts forward, however, is not without its 
problems, at least at the moment when one wishes to speak of ideological effects 
and acknowledge their primacy in visual communication, as Bürgin is quick to 
recognize. He adds that “[i]n the social world,” which it seems is the more 
problematic one since it sets the ground for the practice of daily life, “meaning 
must come to rest somewhere” (Diderot, Barthes, Vertigo 85). This ‘somewhere,’ 
a moment no doubt ridden with the political as well as the cultural and the social, 
constitutes something of a limit in more than one sense of the word. The 
frameworks that are established in terms of such a constitution make up the chief 
concern Bürgin follows in much of his work. The ‘fact’ of the social world, that 
is, leads immediately to a singular question which Bürgin prefers to answer in a 
singular way: “[W]hat is it that sets limits on the meaning of images?” (“Diderot, 
Barthes, Vertigo” 85). The most important point of leverage among the ones that 
surround Burgin’s response seem to concern, however, that there exist a sharp 
limit indeed, rather than the particulars of that limit. In other words, that subjects 
are far from being able to recognize the constraints that set the meaning of 
images, let alone be involved in the production of certain questions that can insult 
their ‘truth.’
Victor Bürgin continues articulating a line of thinking that renounces 
photography an identity proper in “Looking at Photographs” (hereafter 
“Looking”) as well, where he strives to make further evident that quite 
unmistakable fact that “photographs permeate the environment, facilitating the 
formation/reflection/inflection of what we ‘take for granted’” (142). Photographs
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partake in this very process of naturalization in much the same way other means 
of the transportation and dissemination of ideology: by ‘losing’ “themselves in the 
ordinary world they help to construct” (Bürgin, “Looking” 143). And the proper 
occupation of contemporary theory is to follow “photography beyond where it has 
effaced its operations in the ‘nothing-to-explain’” (Bürgin, “Looking” 142). That 
is, not in the pervasively invasive contexts photographs are to be found and are 
‘naturally’ overwhelmed by, but in the space of ideological analysis which the 
analyst has to construct if he or she is to ever (momentarily) step out of the 
influential, vicious circle of invasions himself or herself: to ‘look’ at photographs 
with fresh eyes, or eyes that are informed by theory rather than blinded by 
common sense, as it were.
Contrary to some of his assertions that appear at first sight to insist on a 
historical continuity of that notorious optical device that belonged to the 18*** 
century, the camera obscura, and the particular epistemology it partakes in, Bürgin 
is careful enough to emphasize that accounts which associate the ‘invention of the 
camera’ merely with a particular ‘nuancing’ of art history risk reinstalling lines of 
thought that belong to theories that aim to encourage the analysis of ‘art in itself ’ 
Consequently, art historical stories of origin are “cast within the familiar confines 
of a succession of ‘masters’, ‘masterworks’ and ‘movements’ -  a partial account 
which leaves the social fact of photography largely untouched” (Bürgin, 
“Looking” 143). Bürgin, then, announces the need for and begins undertaking a 
demonstration of an approach to photography that would stress the dimensions of 
the differences involved in the experience of photographs and other ‘media.’ That 
is, an understanding that strives to operate against accounts of photography 
wherein it is situated ‘between’ painting and film, as if photography’s standing in
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the chronological trajectory justifies this strange positioning, and because it shares 
“the static image with painting, the camera with/?/wj” (Bürgin, “Looking” 143). 
Apparently, we have no choice but to join Bürgin in understanding such accounts 
of photography as ones that are dangerously involved with the installation of a 
narrowly linear and thus disabling understanding of art history wherein 
differences and disjuncture are omitted and cultural history is reduced to a motive 
for ‘realism’ and ‘higher technology’ in the arts. It seems it should rigorously be 
emphasized, as Bürgin does, that photography “is encountered in a fundamentally 
different way from either [painting or film]” (“Looking” 143). The essentials of 
these differences, however, seem to matter more than Bürgin appears to take them 
to. Although it is certainly necessary to account for the observation that 
“photographs offer themselves gratuitously, whereas paintings and film readily 
present themselves to critical attention as objects, photographs are received rather 
as an environment” (Bürgin, “Looking” 143), the permeation of photographs and 
photography in everyday life appears to invite a further detailed analysis of the 
conditions that such permeation requires, and the unusual coupling of the 
everyday with art in the 19* and 20* centuries that Walter Benjamin identified 
with impressive accuracy seem to demand closer inspection, which the second 
part of this study will attempt to hint at. Let us turn for the moment, however, to 
the particular ways in which Victor Bürgin presents his conception of the ‘effects’ 
and affects photographs -  and, to a lesser degree, photography -  represent for the 
subject, who is, if anyone, given to such effects by definition.
The rhetoric of representation and ideology Bürgin seems to endeavor to 
establish in a photographic framework appears to invite a requirement to 
conceptualize the two ‘ends’ of the photographic process as immutable resources
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of making meaning. Therefore, much of Burgin’s attention is devoted to the 
subject of the photograph on the one hand of the ‘equation’ (the pro-photographic, 
etc.) and the subject of the photograph on the other hand (the subject of the 
symbolic order, etc.). Consequently, the ‘photograph of the subject’ does not 
receive the consideration it seems to demand. For it to be “one signifying system 
among others in a society which produces the ideological subject in the same 
movement in which they ‘communicate’ their ostensible ‘contents’” (Bürgin, 
“Looking” 153), photography as well its resources and ‘products’ (which are not 
limited to photographs per se, or, more fittingly, which might have nothing to do 
with photography or photographs as such) have to remain, and remain 
undisturbed, in the framework that had been drawn in their name in advance. In 
other words,
[t]he effect of representation (the recruitment of the subject in the 
production of ideological meanings) requires that the stage of the 
represented (that of the photograph as object-text) meet the stage 
of the representing (that of the viewing subject) in a ‘seamless 
join.’ (Bürgin, “Looking” 150)
Bürgin takes the ‘seamless join’ that is thus achieved to be an effect of 
photography, or in his terms of ‘photographic discourse,’ which he has maintained 
is itself a product of other, ‘more self-governing’ discourses and not properly 
discursive as such. However, since Bürgin devotes a great deal of effort to 
founding that photography operates in significantly different ways than other -  
however similar -  modes of visual communication like painting and cinema, one 
cannot help but wonder whether the particular manners of the effects the 
inscription of which facilitate the reign of the ‘seamless join’ can be peculiar to 
photography. It emerges, contrarily, that the deployment of the picture perfect 
adherence of the subject to the ideological line of work is in no way a
31
photographie enterprise, and, furthermore, that it runs quite independently of the
particular ‘medium’ in question. It has, above all else, to do with the installation
of a technical category, or, more suitably, a mechanical one. Optical mechanics
and the apparatus they engender are the signifiers and, consequently, generators, if
not straightforward carriers, of a certain ideology of seeing. The lens -  taken to be
central not only to photography but also to cinema, the camera obscura, the
stereoscope, and a host of other devices of seeing or visual communication, as
well as to painting by a latent yet somehow observable relationship -  almost
single-handedly “arranges all information according to laws of projection which
place the subject as geometric point of origin of the scene in imaginary
relationship with real space” (Burgin, “Looking” 152) .^ Thus the lens is candidate
to perform two operations at once, and that for several past centuries and more to
come. The first level of its dual mechanics concerns a distancing, a separation, or
a severe severance. According to Burgin, the
distancing of the subject from a separate and neutral reality, in 
what Husserl called the ‘natural attitude’, is magnified when the 
world is viewed through a lens. Compressed against the viewing 
screen into a single plane, chopped by the viewfinder into neat 
rectangles, the world is even more likely to be experienced as 
remote and inert. (“Photographic Practice” 47)
Subjects are therefore left isolated, detached and rendered aloof from ‘the world,’ 
or better still, ‘the real world. ’ In other words, they are made susceptible to the 
inscriptions of ideology, which makes its appearance at just this moment. The
* It should perhaps be noted that this expression by Burgin can be understood to be reminiscent of 
the way Althusser defines ideology, wherein it is taken to entail an imaginary relationship to real 
conditions. However, Burgin’s line of thought in general could also be understood to be negligent 
towards the performative aspect of Althusser’s conceptualization of the subject. (Althusser insists 
that the ‘subject’ he is interested in conceptualizing is and is not recruited prior to being hailed: the 
processes of recruitment and hailing are not chronologically ordered.) It can also be suggested that 
Burgin can be understood here to allocate an essential status to the lens as the ‘perpetuator’ of 
ideology. On the problems involved with such a restriction of the discussion of image technologies 
to the camera and the lens, see Commoli.
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second level of operation the lens is put to use finalizes the sudden act of 
inversion through which the relation of ‘the world’ to the subject is rearranged. 
Erected between ‘the world’ and the subject are the images that a lens produces 
and that (mis)guide the subject to another world, which is that of ideological 
effects. The subject is thus recruited in a very definitive framework that presents 
him or her with a screen impenetrably opaque to ‘the real’ but transparent to 
ideology. The subject thus comes to be “constructed within,” rather than 
alongside, “the technical apparatus itself’ (Bürgin, Looking 146), and the camera 
(or the lens) becomes the primary form of vehiculation through which ideological 
subjection takes place.
Bürgin, moreover, goes on to maintain that “technical apparatus” can be 
understood to open up the singular operating system “upon which all photographs 
depend,” while “[wjork in semiotics showed that there is ... no single signifying 
system ... upon which all photographs depend,” since photography extorts, and 
never distorts, the smooth operations of “a heterogeneous complex of codes” 
(Bürgin, “Looking” 143). It appears so that Bürgin presumes the agency of the 
supremacy of what he calls “technical apparatus” in the process of making 
meaning: the lens and by extrapolation the camera -  and at their origin the 
ideology of ‘geometrical’ vision -  are situated virtually as the very ground 
photography substantiates as its artery of signification. A singular positioning, an 
operation that bears an immutable affectivity for the subject, is what by corollary 
follows: “the subjective effect of the camera” reemphasizes “a coherence founded 
in the unifying gaze of a unified, punctual, subject” (Bürgin, “Looking” 150). And 
“photography theory” had better “take account of the production of this subject as 
the complex totality of its determinations are nuanced and constrained in their
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passage through and across photographs” (Bürgin, “Looking” 153. Emphasis
added). Whatever they may possibly be about, then, photographs are actually
about the possession of the subject in itself and for a subjective economy that
capitalizes on that possession. They are the agents of an operation which,
however, would not suffer from their inactivity: ideology knows of no substances,
only forms. Concurrently, since photographs entail at best a solely transformative
differentiation in terms of their relation to ‘things-out-there,’ when magically
‘disregarded,’ photography bows them out to the originary system they belong to,
which it nevertheless could only emphasize. Besides, the ideological employment
photography is conferred is in no way distinctive to it, however strongly its
utilization could be understood to put a spin on it. Bürgin tracks it along the lines
of what could amount to remaining very assorted systems of signification:
The signifying system of photography, like that of classical 
painting, at once depicts a scene and the gaze o f the spectator, an 
object and a viewing subject. The two-dimensional analogical 
signs of photography are formed within an apparatus which is 
essentially that of the camera obscura of the Renaissance.
(“Looking” 146)
The apparatus in question, of course, cannot be allocated to a single optical 
device, or even a constrained historical period. Rather, it is the pre-requirement, in 
Bürgin’s line of thought, for any system of representation, or at least for visual 
communication. At the heart of this apparatus, then, are “geometric projection” 
and the by-product it generates and imposes: “a unique point of view” (Bürgin, 
“Looking” 146). “It is the position of point-of-view, occupied in fact by the 
camera, which is bestowed upon the spectator” (Bürgin, “Looking” 146). 
Consequently, this imposition works first and foremost to secure the coherence of 
the subject and the immobility of the dimensions that foreclose the subject’s space
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of activity. In other words, while the ‘system of the lens’ assures that ‘the world’
is displaced or at least rendered ‘remote and inert’ and ‘illusion’ adjacent and
active, the ‘system of the frame’ further shelters this installation from the possible
violations of the moving eye, or, in other words, the incongruence that could
behold a subject. Bürgin asserts that
[t]o the point-of-view, the system of representation adds frame,
(an inheritance which may be traced through easel painting, via 
mural painting, to its origin in the convention of post and lintel 
architectural construction); through the agency of the frame the 
world is organized into a coherence which it actually lacks, into a 
parade of tableaux, a succession of ‘decisive moments.’
(“Looking” 146)^
The frame, furthermore, ensures that the movement the “depicted space” has the 
potential to invite for the “eye/I” is denied or disturbed: this movement can only 
run “ocroÄi it to the points where it encounters the frame” (“Looking” 152). For 
Bürgin, the constitution of the frame blocks all amendment despite experiences 
that seem to suggest otherwise. It is an establishment, on the other hand, that 
Bürgin notices to occasionally have a difficult time standing up. Elaborating on a 
photograph by Friedlander, he relates of the experience of viewing it as one in 
which “the conjunction of technical photographic apparatus and raw 
phenomenological flux has almost failed to guarantee” the wholesomeness of the 
boundary the concept of the frame represents (“Looking” 150). Bürgin compares 
and contrasts this photograph with another one, which he suggests is utterly loyal 
to the maintenance of the lineal formation of the spectator-subject. Although in 
‘extreme’ cases, that is, when the spectator is faced with a photograph that offers
 ^ See also “Photography, Phantasy, Function,” 187, where die association with painting is rendered 
in more explicit terms. For an elaborate account of the ways in which the articulation of such 
associations across different visual registers brings Burgin’s arguments closer to those of the 
‘modernist formalists’ he claims to operate against, see Batchen, Burning with D esire: The 
Conception o f  Photography, 19.
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him or her “raw phenomenological flux,” the experience of viewing a photograph 
can be understood to deviate from the ideological mission photography is 
bestowed upon, in principle, looking at photographs do not fail to help endure the 
viewer’s position as subject, and furthermore, his or her subject-position. 
Ultimately, “the picture (and therefore the subject) remains ‘well composed’” 
(Burgin, “Looking” 150). What is interesting is that Burgin, in exemplifying that 
even photographs which could motivate the analyst to doubt his assumptions can 
be understood to participate in the same economy as more ‘obviously ideological’ 
images, has therefore to install a framework wherein photographs could be 
differentiated from each other by the degree to which they submit to the pre-given 
schemas of textual experience. The rhetoric and practice of ‘good composition,’ 
then, becomes the key element that motivates the inscription of the ideological in 
the photograph:
‘Good composition’ may therefore be no more or less than a set of 
devices for prolonging our imaginary command of the point-of- 
view, or ¿'^//-assertion, a device for retarding recognition of the 
autonomy of the frame, and the authority of the other it signifies. 
‘Composition’ (and indeed the interminable discourse about 
composition -  formalist criticism) is therefore a means of 
prolonging the imaginary force, the real power to please, of the 
photograph. (“Looking” 152)
It should perhaps be noted at this point that Victor Burgin’s conceptualization of 
photographic composition seems to point to the intervention of an important 
dispersion within the schema of criticism he strives to install. Burgin, a practicing 
artist and a critique, has to advance his line of thought in such diffusive manner, it 
appears, as to be able to conceptualize photography as a practicable, creatively 
viable field. In other words, Burgin ultimately has to take a stop to attribute an 
agency and a closure to the field of photographic discourse, if only in order to
36
create room for photographic practices and experiences wherein the general 
ideological motif of the photograph is to be suspended or surpassed. Although the 
photographic field does not generally figure as a constitutive mode of discourse in 
Burgin’s thought, such a conception nevertheless makes its way in. Burgin notes 
that
to reject the ‘transcendental’ subject is not to suggest that either the 
subject or the institutions within which it is formed are caught in a 
simple mechanistic determinism; the institution of photography, 
while a product of the symbolic order, also contributes to this 
order. (“Looking” 145-6. Emphasis added.)
Furthermore, Burgin can also be read to propose that “it is most important that 
photography be recovered from its own appropriation to this [: the symbolic, 
ideological] order,” “precisely because of its real role in constructing the 
imaginary, the misrecognitions necessary to ideology” (“Looking” 153). 
Photography, then, although at most times it is a more-than-helpful servant in 
maintaining subjects and ideologies, can be ‘saved.’
The theme of ‘recovery’ that can be tracked in Burgin’s writing can be 
found articulated explicitly and in further elaborated form in other thinkers who 
participate in the so-called postmodern critique of photography. I would like to 
turn for a moment to such an articulation, as laid by Abigail Solomon-Godeau, in 
order to be able to better explicate the political directions and strategies Burgin 
can be understood to point towards.
Pointing out that photography “has become a principal agent and conduit 
of culture and ideology” in industrialized societies (76), Solomon-Godeau, in 
“Photography After Art Photography,” sets out to contrast (modern) ‘art 
photography’ with ‘postmodern photography,’ or, more appropriately, with the 
employment of photography in ‘postmodern art,’ in order that the potential the
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latter has to promise is spelled out. Solomon-Godeau notes that ‘art photography’ 
and ‘postmodern art’ stand in complete opposition, particularly because “the 
properties of photographic imagery which have made it a privileged medium in 
postmodern art are precisely those which for generations art photographers have 
been concerned to disavow” (76). She furthermore asserts that the employment of 
photography in ‘postmodernism,’ in a way that is reminiscent of Burgin’s 
proposal, tends toward a reluctance to being incorporated in the ideological 
programme and subjective economy ‘art photography’ is responsible for carrying 
out, if not for advancing. According to Solomon-Godeau, there is a “generic 
distinction” between the ways photographs operate in their postmodernist 
employments and the usual mechanics of art photography, and the roots of this 
distinction lie in the “potential for institutional and/or representational critique, 
analysis, or address” “photographic use in postmodernism” is capable of invoking 
(77). ‘Art photography,’ on the other hand, is characterized, if not defined on the 
outset, by a “deep-seated inability to acknowledge any need to even think about 
such matters” (Solomon-Godeau 77).
However, postmodern art tends toward critique through emphasizing what
Solomon-Godeau understands to be photography’s intrinsic qualities: its being
simultaneously indexical and iconic (77). Further,
[tjhat photography should thus figure as a crucial terms in 
postmodernism seems both logical and (at least retrospectively) 
inevitable. Virtually every critical and theoretical issue with which 
postmodernist art may be said to engage in one sense or another 
can be located within photography. Issues having to do with 
authorship, subjectivity, and uniqueness are built into the very 
nature of the photographic process itself (Solomon-Godeau 80)
In Solomon-Godeau’s understanding, ‘postmodern art’ promises a breakthrough 
from the rigid modernist boundaries photography is prone to being subjected to
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when it is left to its own devices, or those of the institutions -  like art photography
-  through the schemas of which it generally nurtures as an approvable practice.
Postmodernism is understood to position itself critically in relation to the
institutional spaces that manage what photography is and how it operates, and,
thus, is approached by Solomon-Godeau as a ‘legitimate’ practice, in opposition
to ‘regular’ photography, susceptible to discourses whose operations are prior to
and formative of it. Although photography has “potential for rigorous, critical, and
conceptually sophisticated works” (Solomon-Godeau 85), this potential -
repressed in ‘art photography’ -  has to be brought about by the postmodern or
postmodernist intervention. On the other hand, since “[t]he current political
environment... does not favor critical practices in any media,” “it seems
reasonable to predict that the photographic practices that will remain most favored
will be those that call the fewest things into question” (Solomon-Godeau 85), and,
therefore, to resist expecting the progressive possibilities postmodernism promises
for photographic discourse to flourish in the near future.
Let us pause to remember Victor Burgin’s main thrust of argument on
photography; what he maintains is photography’s primary role:
It is hear that we encounter a general social effect of photographs.
A major part of the political import of photographic signification is 
its constant confirmation and reduplication of subject-positions for 
the dominant social order through its imbrication within such 
dominant discursive formations as, for example, those which 
concern family life, erotic encounters, competitiveness and so on.
[...] But ‘art’ photographs are not exempt from such 
determinations of meaning, determinations which are achieved 
even where actual writing is absent. (“Photography, Phantasy,
Function” 205)
While appearing to follow Burgin in putting photographs and their uses that are 
not characterized by an intent to critical practice in their place, Solomon-Godeau
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in fact spells out a proposition that Burgin hints at but does not explicate: there are 
photographic categories or uses of photography that the postmodern critique of 
photography feels the necessity to understand as exempt from ‘such 
determinations of meaning.’
In reviewing a post-revolutionary Russian school of photographic practice,
the work and programme of “Oktyabr,” Victor Burgin makes it clear that an
exhaustive critique of photography cannot but approach skeptically to
photographic practices that may seem to follow through its insights. Attempts, in
other words, to invent a different photography, as the efforts of the Oktyabr group
represent, are destined to fail at succeeding to mobilize photography to different
ends than that already determined for it. Burgin contends that
[w]e may ... endorse the basic premise of the Oktyabr leftists’ 
programme for photography: looking is not indifferent. [...]
However, this is to endorse the Oktyabr premise so completely as 
to overwhelm the argument based on it: that the ideology of the 
subject may be overthrown by a ‘revolution in perception’ -  for it 
can now no longer be a question of the ideology of the subject, a 
body of ideas the subject ‘owns’, and may abandon; it is now 
rather a question of that very ideology of the subject which informs 
the previous formulation. Such a punctual subject of ideology may 
not be overthrown by the camera as that subject is inscribed in the 
very functioning of the instrument itself and in the very history of 
the act of looking. (“Photography, Phantasy, Function” 188)
What is interesting in Burgin’s approach to photographic practices that aim to 
follow a programme which proposes to alter the ways in which photography 
regularly operates and functions is its apparent and unexpected inflexibility.
While maintaining that the experience of viewing photographs involves complex 
predeterminations and dynamics the ascription of which cannot be reduced to 
either of the categories of photographer, photograph and spectator, Burgin is 
never tired of binding these categories to each other and then to ‘the ideology of
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the subject’ with immutable connections. The “fact [...] that the photograph is a 
place o f work,” which Burgin asserts is “of primary social importance” 
(“Looking” 153. Emphasis added.), can therefore be understood to exert force that 
is only supplementary for his arguments. For the ‘place of work’ Burgin has in 
mind is one in which the work is always already labored in advance, so much so 
that the photographer, the photograph, and the viewer figure space as important 
and deep only as placeholders in it. How, then, it seems it should be questioned, 
are practices that would not be caught in the mechanics of the ‘ideology of the 
subject,’ ‘photographies’ that would not be overdetermined by the “integrated 
specular regime” that maps out industrialized societies (Burgin, “Looking” 152) 
even likely of being undertaken? The question, however, is not restricted to 
photography or photographic practice per se, but colors all activities that have to 
do with the production and consumption of images, activities which Burgin 
nonetheless is reluctant to tell apart. Borrowing the critical concept of ‘suture’ 
from film theory, Burgin is quick to note that the processes the operations of 
which this concept denotes are not restricted to the movie-theater. Rather, the 
questions film theory raises are valid for all environments where a spectator is 
present:
[T]he apparatus which desire has constructed for itself incorporates 
all those aspects of contemporary Western society for which the 
Situationists chose the name spectacle·, aspects forming an 
integrated specular regime, engaged in a mutual exchange of 
energies, not strung out in mutual isolation along some historicist 
progress; desire needs no material darkness in which to stage its 
imaginary satisfactions. (“Looking” 153)
Another gloss-through the framework Burgin builds, however, reveals that in fact 
he refuses to limit the stage in which desire maps its objects to the visual field. 
“The primary suturing instance of the discourse of still photography,” which
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“takes the form of an identification of the subject with the camera position” 
(Bürgin, “Photography, Phantasy, Function” 189), holds also true for any other 
form or type of discourse. It derives from the general mechanism suture is 
responsible for deploying, which is none other than the recruitment of the subject 
in the ‘ideological’ sense: “Suture operates within all forms of discourse as a 
movement of construction/incorporation of the subject in the discourse in 
question: a set of effects in which the subject recognizes the discourse as its own” 
(Bürgin, “Photography, Phantasy, Function” 188). It is difficult, therefore, to not 
align with Geoffrey Batchen in pointing out that Bürgin has to look “through the 
photograph in search of something that necessarily has its origin elsewhere,” 
much “[l]ike the desiring subject he describes” {Burning with Desire: The 
Conception o f Photography [hereafter Conception], 11), in order that “the 
experience of the photograph can be readily incorporated into a Lacanian theory 
of the subject” {Conception 10). Not only, however, does “this psychoanalytic 
version of photography’s origins still does not account for the specificity of the 
timing, the morphology, or the cultural focus of the desire to photograph” as 
Batchen points out {Conception 113), but neither does it help understand and 
explain the distinct processes of affection that overwhelm the experience of 
different images that are understood to have originated through different ‘means.’ 
“In effect, this makes the desire to photograph,” and, we might perhaps 
add, the desire to look at photographs, “but one instance of a more general 
desiring economy common to all times and places and therefore transcending 
historical and cultural difference. In other words, Bürgin replaces one originary 
essence, ‘photography in itself,’ with another, ‘desire in itself’” (Batchen, 
Conception 113). Such an overarching approach to social determination,
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consequently, makes one certainly wonder what sorts of practice the ‘“new forms 
of politicisation’ within the institutions of art (and) photography” (“Photography, 
Phantasy, Function” 216) Bürgin calls for could denote. According to Bürgin, 
these forms would not have to abandon the existing modes of practice that 
saturate the photographic environment, but would necessarily “begin with the 
recognition that meaning is perpetually displaced from the image to the discursive 
formations which cross and contain it” (Photography, Phantasy, Function 216). 
Bürgin, apparently, is not suggesting that, in order to contribute new terms of 
politicization in photography and art, artists and critiques should attempt at 
altering the ‘autonomous’ discursive formations that are responsible for how 
photography functions. Since, however, he contends without doubt “that there can 
be no question of either ‘progressive’ contents or forms in themselves, nor any 
ideally ‘effective’ synthesis of the two” (“Photography, Phantasy, Function” 216), 
his approach to the occupation of spaces in the institutions of art that would allow 
for ‘new forms of politicization’ seems actually to leave no room for any political 
practice whatsoever, aside from that of the critic, or the artist-critic.
2.3 Photography as a T otalized Field
In an interview he gave on the possibilities new forms of politicization in 
institutions of photography and art could promise, John Tagg offers his comments 
on photographic practices that aim to counter dominant ideologies through an 
effort to use photographs as a means of disseminating unacknowledged and 
potentially subversive, and thus supposedly progressive, truth-claims. He relates 
these practices to have been “volubly committed to street photography, to the idea 
that Reality is out there on the streets and you’ve got to get out there, that’s the
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radical thing to do” (Lukitsh 226). In order to able to search for, locate and 
disseminate ‘the truth,’ however, the practices Tagg has in mind are obligated to 
take their motivation from a particular conception of the subject of ‘their’ 
photography, and presume that “[tjhere is the Real, out there, it can be possessed 
and brought back, and the truth will blow apart ideology” (Lukitsh, 226). The 
following discussion takes the warning Tagg raises in the name of photographic 
practice seriously and aims at understanding whether a respective positing of ‘the 
real’ and/or ‘the truth’ comes to be necessary also for John Tagg’s articulations on 
photography to occupy a reasonable place within the critique of photography. In 
other words, whether the challenges Tagg imposes in the name of certain 
photographic practices could be leveled at the practice of historically informed 
photography critique that targets to undermine the established order of art history 
he is involved with. Whether Tagg’s discussion of photography, and in particular 
his conception of the relation of photography with power demonstrate any cues of 
tangibly graspable difference from the ‘reflectionism’ he frequently holds 
Althusser responsible for having posited as a means of the analysis of power 
remains to be seen.
John Tagg’s eloquent articulations on photography seem to stem from a
radical proposition: that there has never been a ‘photography,’ in the singular, and
if a field of practice and experience have been aggregately termed under this
single heading, this finds its reasons in no place other than the dedicated labors of
discourse and ideology in accumulating different kinds of practices or different
‘photographies’ together. Tagg relates that
[tjhere is a complex topography of debates and spaces which we 
must map out, and historians of photographies -  an unavoidable 
coinage since the category is indelibly plural -  cannot avoid the 
question of the stratification of photographic practices and its
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consequences, which cut right across their own institutional 
practice. (“The Proof of the Picture” 99-100)
Asserting that photography-as-a-field and the different photographic practices that 
make it up had to be constructed and maintained through the agency of “specific 
discursive economies that are sited in specific institutions and practices, supported 
by specific agents, and invested with specific relations of power,” Tagg directs 
attention to the agency of “legitimations” that “are never given in advance but 
have to be produced and negotiated,” and whose effects are derivative of those of 
discourse ‘itself (“The Proof of the Picture” 102). While photographs can at 
times be defined as objects that carry through an “openness,” “this openness ... [is 
usually] contained and a specific reading [is] to be constructed and imposed” 
(Tagg, “The Proof of the Picture” 109). In order to for this imposition to work as 
intended, in Tagg’s approach, photographs or certain photographs that belonged to 
certain ‘photographies’ have had to be given occupation in the general discursive 
economy as vehicles of ‘truth,’ while a category named photography and rendered 
undifferentiated was designated as a common producer of ‘truths. ’ What we can 
term ‘the negotiation of photography-as-we-know-it,’ then, can be said to have 
succeeded in part through a certain process by which subjects are ‘tricked. ’ These 
processes, at the present moment, are ‘facts’ of a history the ‘progressive 
outcome’ of which John Tagg would wish would have turned out otherwise: 
“[T]he proof of the picture was in the reading. The photographs had to have their 
status as truth produced and institutionally sanctioned” (“The Proof of the 
Picture” 111).
John Tagg, without doubt, has been responsible for helping “the 
emergence of a distinctive theory of photography’s relationship to power,” and his
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can be regarded as “a pioneering effort to relate the work of Michel Foucault to 
the history of photography” (Batchen, “Photography, Power and Representation” 
7). However, Tagg’s is a particular take on that body of work, and while the 
discussion aimed at here has no intention of reviewing his arguments as a follower 
of Foucault’s, to help understand whether those arguments could be regarded to 
treat power as a site that resists rigid localization seems to be necessary. What 
could it mean to argue that in the process of its social as well as technical 
advancement “the powers photography wielded were never its own” (Tagg, “The 
Proof of the Picture” 111)? It could, for example, be taken to suggest that not only 
did photography’s development in the 19*** century shared the dynamics that 
motivated industrial capitalism, but was straightforwardly demanded by them. 
Indeed, according to Tagg,
photography seemed to bring to the institutions involved certain 
powers they sought -  the power of a new and intrusive look; the 
power of a new means and mode of accumulative knowledge; the 
power to structure belief and recruit consent; the power of 
conviction and the power to convict. (“The Proof of the Picture”
111)
As a pre-digested tool for the intrusions of power, photography, then, had to 
assume a destiny set for its name in advance. Far from internalizing power, let 
alone mobilizing a power of its own, the surface of its products had to remain sole 
facades, allowing streams of discourse to slide through one photograph to the 
next.
Like Victor Bürgin, Tagg makes deconstructing the propositions of 
modernist formalism a primary object of his work, putting more attention on 
countering “[cjriticism’s hypostasizing of art ‘in itself, originality and the 
creative subject” (“The Proof of the Picture” 117) than outlining the specific role
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photography might have played for discourse and the specifics of that role. This 
intense focus on context, however, seems to invite dangerous propositions. While 
it would be difficult not to agree with Tagg in suggesting that “it is this 
institutional field of discursive strategies, the relations of power which invest 
them and the effects of power they produce, that we must study” (“The Proof of 
the Picture” 112), the reasons why photography fails to figure as an institutional 
field in itself are hardly intelligible. Would not it be possible, furthermore, to 
argue that the “institutional interventions” Tagg would like to allude to are 
rendered even more remote in the context of his own arguments, much like “the 
[ajnalyses premised on the positing of photography as such,” which “can never 
theorise this [i.e. institutional interventions] as the historiographical task” (“The 
Proof of the Picture” 112)? In effect, indeed, it would seem that positing an 
agency in some pure form to the level solely of institutions which were to 
mobilize, interpret, “and to the discursive, institutional and political strategies” 
which would support and validate the politics of photography (Tagg, “The Proof 
of the Picture” 111) would call for a task very difficult to undertake, let alone 
imagined. John Tagg is certainly aware that “we have to live with the fact that 
there is no externality, nor any natural grounds on which to base a struggle or 
motivate resistance with the promise of (human) emancipation” (“Totalled 
Machines: Criticism, Photography and Technological Change” [hereafter 
“Totalled Machines”] 120). However, it is to those very grounds that are out of 
cultural reach that his mode of critique seems to point to in terms of ‘practical’ 
intervention.
Merely an instance of the “new generation of technologies [that] has 
arrived to discipline, punish, absorb and, finally, replace mere fleshly bodies in
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new and potentially overwhelming ways” (Tagg, “Totalled Machines” 119), the 
advancement of photography, although understood as a social threat at first 
because of its so-called democratizing possibilities, never were put under 
‘positive’ social uses, rendering “Benjamin’s wishful predictions” (Tagg, “The 
Proof of the Picture” 100) obsolete. Before the potentials Walter Benjamin 
thought photography promised could even be considered, the agency of industrial 
capitalism
readily appropriated the latest technologies -  photography 
prominent among them -  though it was as suspicious of their 
productivity as it was of the social itself. It sought to make them 
servile instruments of its compulsive knowledge, driven by a 
separation, isolation and subjugation of its still troubling object, 
but eliding the erotic character of its curiosity, denying desire and 
the exchange of pleasure. (Tagg, “Discontinous City” 141)
These historical dynamics, however, were already played out and their
consequences set in place before either photography as a concept and practice
assumed a social character or Benjamin wrote his respective analysis.
Since it has never been “a unique technology or an autonomous semiotic
system,” Tagg has it that “the unity of the field of photographic meanings”
(“Totalled Machines” 128) have been necessarily supplemented by the sovereign
and extramural systems that discourse set in place. Certainly, approaches that
propose that a certain set of expressive methods is what binds all photographs
together, securing their meaning through a technical and metaphysical operation,
has to be thoroughly interrogated, as Tagg does vigorously. However, it seems
that to suggest that there are no other shared, peculiar characteristics to
photographs than the ‘single range of technical devices’ they make use of, as Tagg
appears to offer, is equally inadequate. Without having to posit the “notion of
photography as a unified medium, with its own inherent qualities and consequent
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potentialities for good or bad” (Tagg, “Totalled Machines” 129) right at the 
outset, it should be possible, at least in principle, to articulate the identifiable traits 
of the photographic event, and resist in the process the temptations of deferring 
the possibly positive aspects of the photographic experience either to an 
irreducible, extra-terrestrial field or to a technical determinism that would operate 
on condition that the agency of the social and the subject are nullified.
Through a strategy of critique that reminds us of Burgin’s, Tagg’s next 
move is to categorically elevate ‘the Real’ and its materiality to the place of that 
which denies the production of (real) knowledge about itself. The new 
(insubstantial) substance of ‘the Real,’ however, is only a byproduct of post­
industrial capitalism, and of photography to the extent that it was serviceable to 
that order. Very much like money, photography blocks access to reality by 
offering a seemingly superior, naturally inferior form of experience. “Solid 
substance,” then, although it used to be an inhabitable territory of relationships, is 
not any more a humane category: “Indeed, as with money itself under capitalism, 
so great is the mystery of this fetishised token of equivalence that ‘solid 
substance’ seems poor exchange” (Tagg, “Totalled Machines” 124). What 
supplants it is “a complex discursive reality, figured at every level in metaphors 
which multiplied its meanings” (Tagg, “The Proof of the Picture” 104). The 
‘Real’ that is taken to inflict the photograph, “that was thereby called up for the 
photographs,” is, then, of a different persuasion, it is ‘the real’ at best, “though 
represented as inhering in them” (Tagg, “The Proof of the Picture” 104). The 
negotiation of photography, the negotiation, more appropriately, that created 
photography, has therefore been “produced by imposing a transparency on 
experience and representation, as the instruments of an overwhelming truth,”
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since discourse categorically “needed to enforce the immediate presence o f ...
[its] object to ... [its] subject” (Tagg, “Discontinuous City: Picturing and the 
Discursive Field” [hereafter “Discontinuous City”] 141). A great deal of Tagg’s 
suggestions can thus be understood to intend to displace the notion that the ‘Real’ 
and the ‘Truth’ that photographs are taken to thrive in and refer to are necessarily 
of a secondary nature, and are at best sole ‘constructions:’ merely, the ‘real’ and 
the ‘truth.’
John Tagg, in elaborating his contextual mode of thinking on photography, 
is careful enough to grant at least that “[t]he notion of evidentiality, on which 
nineteenth-century practices of documentation traded, could never be taken as 
already and unproblematically in place” (“Discontinuous City” 143). That is, that 
the conceptualization and advancement of photography were aspects of a social 
rupture. However, he never takes photography to be a principal part of the split 
that it started operating in, but insists that it was merely a timely add-on. 
Photography-as-it-was-practiced was simply supplemented to “a discursive space 
in which a particular photography could be made to operate and in which a 
particularised photography was already prepared, by then, to find its place” (Tagg, 
“Discontinuous City” 142). The dangers involved in the directions Tagg supposes 
we follow when thinking on photography can be found in his own text, in further 
development. In other words, Tagg’s critique of the ways in which photography 
was institutionalized can, it seems, be understood to disturb his own critique as 
well. It is not definitive, for example, whether Tagg, who asserts that those 
autonomous discourses which are responsible for the “fixing in place of certain 
new technologies of representation as purely instrumental modes” 
(“Discontinuous City” 141. Emphasis added.), could be understood to treat
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photography as a purely instrumental device, since for him “no meaning to 
photography as such” can be considered to be in effect (“Totalled Machines” 
129). It becomes all the more difficult, therefore, to distinguish Tagg’s mode of 
ciritical operation from those
conceptions of cultural practices as reflections, expressions, 
superstructures, ideologies or functional apparatuses of social 
reproduction [that] have to deny that the discourses, practices and 
institutions that constitute the cultural can accomplish anything in 
themselves, other than the re-presentation of what is already in 
place, at some more ‘basic’ level (Tagg, “Discontinuous City”
149),
as well as from the apparently pedestrian understanding that guide those 
photographers and critics that treat the photograph as a loyally transparent 
transcription of ‘reality.’
The problems that Tagg’s account of photography is shot through with can 
be reflected on in further substantiation through focusing on a principal he 
discloses to have motivated his work: countering the equation of “a discursive 
structure with a technology” (“Discontinuous City” 143)^ .^ Although this 
particular incentive of Tagg’s can be understood to find its motivation in 
deconstructing accounts of photography that are characteristically of a 
technological-determinist persuasion, Tagg’s ceaseless efforts to keep discourse 
distant from technology and representation and his conceptualization of 
photography as an (originally) amorphous field that is viable for habitation by 
dominant discourses but impossible for critical practice point to larger issues.
Critique that aims to invalidate ‘historical’ accounts of photography “in 
which an independent dynamic of mechanical invention, modification, and
It should perhaps be remembered at this point that Foucault frequently referred to discursive 
structures as technologies. This habitual reference could amount to saying that, in the words of 
Gilles Deleuze, “machines are social before being technical” (Foucault, 13. qtd. in Crary 35).
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perfection imposes itself onto a social field, transforming it from the outside” 
(Crary 8), like that of John Tagg’s, is certainly invaluably necessary. However, 
propositions of the exact opposite dimension in which discourse would be 
attributed an overwhelming agency and taken to mold any field whatsoever that 
falls on its path of flow does not seem to be able entertain the productivity of the 
subject or the technology in question any more than modes of technological 
determinism do. In fact, understandings that insist that social field, discourse, 
optical device and viewer are distinct entities could be as limiting as those 
accounts that posit the absolute primacy of technology in governing the 
relationships between these entities. In that, photography perhaps should be 
understood as “a site at which a discursive formation intersects with material 
practices,” irreducible to “either to a technological or a discursive object” (Crary 
31).
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3 PHOTOGRAPHY AS A SPECTRAL MODE OF WRITING
Never to reduce myself-as- 
subject, confronting certain
photographs, to the
disincamated, disaffected socius 
which science is concerned with. 
(Roland Barthes, Camera Lucida 
74)
3.1 Reality Effect and Substance
Starting from the very first section in Camera Lucida, Roland Barthes operates his 
conceptualization of photography on the grounds of the inadequacy of 
structuralism to come to a grasp with it: Photography complicates, or can be even 
said to defy, the logic of the sign as conceived in structural or semiological terms. 
The project Barthes intends to undertake, however, could never be indifferent to 
the efforts of Victor Bürgin or John Tagg, although their comments on it do seem 
to suggest otherwise Very much in the manner in which these writers organized
Bürgin, in “Re-Reading Camera Lucida,” suggests that some of the arguments advanced in 
Camera Lucida “strictly, here, would be a matter between Barthes and his analyst” (86), adding 
that, consequently, ‘‘'Camera Lucida, as a totality, may be read as the autobiographical novel that 
Barthes often said he wished to write” (89). Elsewhere, Bürgin can be seen even more tempted to 
disregard those arguments because they are articulated in the context of “a book which is not a text 
of theory” (“Diderot, Barthes, Vertigo” 92). Tagg’s comment is more interesting in that it takes 
Burgin’s proposition to approach Camera Lucida from the standpoint of the psychoanalyst 
literally: “With all due deference to Roland Barthes, no amormt of pre-Oedipal nostalgia can get 
beyond the disappointing fact that tire photographs do not and could not validate their meanings 
within themselves. The photographs’ compelling weight is not phenomenological but discursive” 
(“The Proof of the Picture” 103).
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their suggestions, Barthes takes off by asking, within the context of a negative
intuition, whether photography ‘really’ exists:
I decided I liked Photography in opposition to the Cinema, from 
which I nonetheless failed to separate it . This question grew 
insistent. I was overcome by an “ontological” desire: I wanted to 
learn at all costs what Photography was “in itself,” by what 
essential feature it was to be distinguished from the community of 
images. Such a desire really meant that beyond the evidence 
provided by technology and usage, and despite its tremendous 
contemporary expansion, I wasn’t sure that Photography existed, 
that it had a “genius” of its own. {Camera Lucida 3)
The concerns of Roland Barthes’s in terms of the existence of photography 
are quite distinct in approach from those of either Victor Bürgin or John Tagg.
The reason why ‘Photography’ may indeed not exist for him is not that it is 
generally neutral towards and susceptible to the vehiculations of discourse or 
ideology, but that a classifying principle that would bind all photographs under its 
sign is difficult to articulate. And, it should perhaps be added, for the 
structuralist/formalist, the question of the existence of forms is usually one that 
has to do with the problem of classification^^. However, Barthes announces at the 
outset that
[f]rom the first step, that of classification (we must surely classify, 
verify by samples, if we want to constitute a corpus). Photography 
evades us. The various distributions we impose upon it are in fact 
either empirical (Professionals / Amateurs), or rhetorical 
(Landscapes / Objects / Portraits / Nudes), or else aesthetic 
(Realism / Pictorialism), in any case external to the object, without 
relation to its essence, which can only be (if it exists at all) the 
New of which it has been the advent; for these classifications 
might very well be applied to other, older forms of representation.
We might say that Photography is unclassiflable. Then I wondered 
what the source of this disorder might be. {Camera Lucida 2)
See on this point “The Third Meaning,” where the essence of the cinema is understood to be 
photographical.
See Propp on this point.
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The disorder Barthes has in mind, furthermore, is not only a technological one,
and concerns not only photography, despite the fact that “[f|ilm and photography
are pure products of the Industrial Revolution. They are not part of a heritage, a
tradition” (Barthes, “On Photography” 354). It further has to do with the position
of theory in regard to the object of analysis:
[W]e should invent a new aesthetics that can deal with both film 
and photography by differentiating them, whereas in reality there is 
a cinematographic aesthetics that functions on the basis of stylistic 
values of a literary kind. Photography hasn’t benefited from this 
transference, appearing instead as a kind of cultural poor relation 
for whom no one wants to claim responsibility. (Barthes, “On 
Photography” 354)
The disorder under question, however, certainly points also to a desire embedded 
in Camera Lucida to interrogate certain modes of analysis that the work of 
Barthes himself has been primarily responsible for advancing. No more ‘reality 
effect,’ then, in this novel understanding but ‘only the real.’ Put more 
appropriately, Barthes seems to suddenly recognize that what he had been calling 
‘reality effect’ has something indeed to do with the ‘real,’ making it hard to install 
any limiting boundary between the two concepts, at least in the case of 
photography:
In the Photograph, the event is never transcended for the sake of 
something else: the Photograph always leads the corpus I need 
back to the body I see; it is the absolute particular, the sovereign 
Contingency, matte and somehow stupid, the This (this 
photograph, and not photography), in short, what Lacan calls the 
Tuché, the Occasion, the Encounter, the Real, in its indefatigable 
expression. (Barthes, Camera Lucida 4)
The relationship between the corpus Barthes feels the need to hold under 
control to the body in the photograph is a total and indispensable one. The 
photograph leads him “not only toward ‘the rest’ of the nakedness, not only
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toward the fantasy of a praxis, but toward the absolute excellence of a being, body 
and soul together” (Camera Lucida 59). The question that remains, however, 
concerns whether the unity and purity of the entire being itself, the being of 
Barthes’s dream, can survive photographic production and reproduction rather 
than fall into pieces. The return to the body that the photograph testifies to is in no 
way a simple homecoming, but will be shown to be extremely ‘spooky. ’ In that 
the being of photography necessitates that “there must be return to the body, but 
to a body that is more abstract than ever,” and therefore facilitates a “spectrogenic 
processes” (Derrida, Specters o f Marx: The State o f the Debt, The Work o f 
Mourning, and the New International [hereafter Specterj·] 126). Before we can 
begin speaking of that process, however, the dimensions of the framework in 
which the photograph relates to the linguistic and to the real should be alluded to 
in more detail.
Although comments on Barthes’s work and reviews of Camera Lucida 
usually and understandably focus on the agreeably important differences this final 
work represents in terms of the Barthesian trajectory, the problems ‘the 
Photograph’ (that is, an existing photograph) bears to mind can be understood to 
inform Barthes’s earlier thought on photography as well. He would argue, in 
“Shock-Photos,” for example, that the power of photography resides in being able 
to efface itself or the procedures of ‘signification’ that impose meanings on its 
products. Commenting on a series of photographs on display under the heading of 
Shock-Photos and that were exclusively ‘aimed’ at shocking the viewers, in this 
article Barthes argues, in a way that reminds us of his suggestions in Camera 
Lucida yet retains something of the ‘postmodern critique of photography,’ that 
since in the space of these photographs viewers had been dispossessed of their
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judgment of recognition, they had “linked to these images only by a technical 
interest” (71). Emphasizing the importance of the activity of the viewer in the 
experience of photography, Barthes adds that the images under question had “no 
history” for the viewer, that they were pre-digested, as it were.
Rendered lacking of an act of viewing through which he would be able to 
make-out the referent of the photograph for his own, Barthes complains that “we 
can no longer invent our own perception of this synthetic nourishment” (“Shock- 
Photos” 71-2) that is called the shock-photo. He further explicates what could be 
appreciated as the beginnings of the rehearsal of a particular approach to 
photography which he will later give its due articulation in Camera Lucida: that 
the power of photography lies in a momentary interruption that the photograph 
introduces into the linguistic apparatus. In “Shock-Photos,” deprived of a 
photograph or a group of photographs that can be employed to demonstrate this 
peculiarity, Barthes introduces this conception in a negative manner. Asserting, 
somewhat paradoxically, that the photographs under consideration cannot help but 
remain “the product of an encumbering will to language,” Barthes understands 
them to operate outside of the field or discourse of photography, and, however 
pretentiously, inside common reading experiences. The ‘technical’ -  which is to 
say, here for Barthes, ‘merely cultural’ -  interest that these photographs invite of 
the viewer
does not exceed the interval of an instantaneous reading: it does 
not resound, does not disturb, our reception closes too soon over a 
pure sign; the perfect legibility of the scene, its formulation 
dispenses us from receiving the image in all its scandal; reduced to 
the state of pure language, the photograph does not disorganize us 
(“Shock-Photo” 72).
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Barthes actually grants a name and an existence to photographs that violate the 
“interval of an instantaneous reading” in “The Photographic Message,” calling
them, strangely enough, shock photos. What he understands from shock, however,
is quite different, it seems, from the understanding that governed the Shock-
Photos exhibition he thus had to denigrate. Holding on to the notion that the
frames of perception of photographs are anything but linguistic, Barthes could go
as far as to grant the possibility of the intervention of a long-drawn-out ‘verbal
interval’ in the photographic experience, linking the latency of the linguistic
faculty in coming to grasp with an infrequent yet traumatic event, which he would
later locate at the heart of the photograph. Locating the perception of the
photograph within general perceptive categories, Barthes relates that
[i]f ... there is no perception without immediate categorization, the 
photograph is verbalized at the very moment it is perceived; or, 
better still: it is perceived only when verbalized (or, if 
verbalization is delayed, there is a disorder of perception, 
interrogation, anxiety of the subject, traumatism ... (“The 
Photographic Message” [hereafter “Message”] 17)
However, the “traumatism” Barthes has in mind, it appears, turns out to be what 
characterizes the difficulty the mythologist faces in conceptualizing the 
photograph. The “difficulties of a structural analysis of the photographic 
message” (Barthes, “Message” 5) indeed stem from the observation, however 
‘mythical,’ that “[sjince the photograph offers itself as a mechanical analogue of 
reality, its first [i.e. denotative] message completely “fills” its substance and 
leaves no room for the development of a second [i.e. connotative] message 
(Barthes, “Message” 6). The structural analysis of the photographic message,
then, can only operate on the basis of the recognition that while “it is possible to 
separate out certain connotation procedures,” these procedures cannot be taken to
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“strictly belong to the photographic structure” (Barthes, “Message” 9). The 
presence of what Barthes names the denotative -  which is a term that brings along 
its own (i.e. linguistic) connotations and limitations -  in/as the photograph, 
however, complicates the separation that any instance of structural analysis that 
concerned it would build upon. Fearful of the risks involved within his own 
argument of “being mythical,” Barthes goes on to elaborate on photography on 
the basis, nevertheless, of “the characteristics which common sense attributes to 
the photograph” (“Message” 7) and which appear to have something of a virtue. 
Reluctant as he is to fall prey to the magic of the photographic message and 
become a ‘common reader,’ who has no choice but to receive “as a simple 
denotation what in fact is a double structure -  denoted-connoted” (“Message” 11), 
Barthes is careful enough to limit the denotative capacity in equating it with a few 
extraordinary photographs:
Is this to say that a pure denotation is impossible? If it exists, it is 
perhaps not at the level of what ordinary language calls the non­
signifying, the neutral, the objective, but quite the contrary at the 
level of strictly traumatic images; trauma is just what suspends 
language and blocks signification. [...] Strictly traumatic 
photographs are rare, the trauma is entirely dependant on the 
certainty that the scene really occurred: the photographer had to be 
there (this is the mythical definition of denotation); but this granted 
... the traumatic photograph ... is the one about which there is 
nothing to say: the shock photo is by structure non-signifying: no 
value, no knowledge, at the limit no verbal categorization can have 
any hold over the process instituting its signification. We might 
imagine a kind of law: the more direct the trauma, the more 
difficult the connotation; or even: the “mythological” effect of a 
photograph is inversely proportional to its traumatic effect.
(“Message” 19-20)
Connotation in the photographic message is quite distinct from the connotative 
capacities of the linguistic message. In photography, “the code of connotation is 
neither artificial (as in a true language) nor natural” (Barthes, “Message” 10).
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Things are further complicated for Barthes by the novelty he senses the 
photograph to introduce into the framework that the sociological analysis of ‘the 
message’ draws in advance for the investigation of meaning. “[A] specific method 
prior to sociological analysis” becomes exceedingly necessary, since “whatever 
the origin and the destination of the message, the photograph is not only a product 
or a channel, it is also an object, endowed with a structural autonomy” (Barthes, 
“Message” 4. Emphasis added.). The method that Barthes intends to constitute in 
“The Photographic Message” -  which “can only be the immanent analysis of that 
original structure which the photograph constitutes” (4) -  motivates him, 
however, to arrive at a very strange conclusion before the method can even be 
declared in its unity.
The violence Barthes’s ‘photographic paradox’ introduces into the 
framework of structural thinking usually goes unnoticed. First and foremost, this 
paradox qualifies the particularity of the photograph against other modes of image 
production or ‘systems of representation,’ in that it nurtures the photograph and 
nothing else. Structuralism, and especially the mode of structuralism that Barthes 
is responsible for elaborating perhaps with terms more definitive than anyone 
else’s, it would be remembered, is notorious for a reluctance to discriminate 
between modes of meaning making. There is more, however, to the ‘photographic 
paradox’ than its qualification of the photograph in negative difference from any 
context of meaning making whatsoever. The “particular status of the photographic 
message” stems from the fact that, in its ‘essential’ center, “/t is a message 
without a code’’ (Barthes, “Message” 5). The shock that Barthes’s hardly expected 
proposition maintains stems from a variety of factors. At the outset, it should 
perhaps be remembered that talking about the ‘presence’ or existence of a
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message, of any message, in terms of the linguistic or semiological endeavor at 
least, presupposes the immediate presence of a code, or, even -  within the 
framework of Barthes’s linguistically overwhelmed semiology -  ‘the code.’ This 
is, it would be remembered, exactly why Saussure had to be insistent to encourage 
the study of ‘langue’ rather than ‘parole.’ Without a code or without a language 
system that is to precede it, parole or utterance is simply inconceivable. Emphasis 
on Barthes’s formulation of ‘the photographic paradox,’ then, could breach open 
the way to understanding the reasons why photography might not exist: it 
certainly does not exist for the semiologist. In other words, although Barthes 
ultimately aligns ‘the photographic paradox’ with a proposition that he 
understands is “an important corollary” to it in “The Photographic Message,” 
namely that “the photographic message is a continuous message” (5), the 
interruption the paradox he is undertaken points to the presence of an irreducible 
aspect of his thinking on photography that cannot be simply nullified through the 
strategies Umberto Eco, for example, has in mind and that emphasize the 
ultimately coded culture of the natural, which is thus taken to be in difference 
from a nature that resists all access and that is ‘truly’ natural.
One of the most interesting propositions of “The Photographic Message” 
concerns the caption that almost always accompanies the news photograph, 
Barthes’s primary object of analysis in this essay. “The text,” suggests Barthes, 
pointing to the caption but also to the work of the connotational framework in 
general, “constitutes a parasitical message intended to connote the image, i.e., to 
''enliven"" it with one or more secondary signifieds (“Message” 14. Emphasis 
added). What is striking in this suggestion concerns not only the recognition that 
Barthes takes, although cautiously, of the connotational aspect in its move
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exceedingly outward to the photograph, but also that he understands the
photographic image to be inanimate. Not only dull, that is, but also non-living,
somewhat devoid of, as it were, a certain ‘culture,’ which is where Barthes locates
the animate parasites of connotation to reside. Added to the ‘photographic
paradox,’ this vein of articulation through which the very essence of photography
would be defined against the grain, so to speak, of its own exchange value (i.e.
circulative animation) has Roland Barthes approach in Camera Lucida in a
peculiar way to the photographic enigma.
The agency of a duality that announced itself earlier to Barthes under the
cover of that which is ‘neither artificial (as in a true language) nor natural’ presses
itself with extreme burden on the photographic surface now in Camera Lucida,
complicating the very logic of the sign:
It is as if the Photograph always carries its referent with itself, both 
affected by the same amorous or funeral immobility, at the very 
heart of the moving world: they are glued together, limb by limb, 
like the condemned man and the corpse in certain tortures; or even 
like those pairs of fish ... which navigate in convoy, as though 
united by an eternal coitus. The Photograph belongs to that class of 
laminated objects whose two leaves cannot be separated without 
destroying them both: the windowpane and the landscape, and why 
not: Good and Evil, desire and its object: dualities we can conceive 
but not perceive. (6)
What photography gives claim to, then, consequently, is a “stubbornness of the 
Referent” (Barthes, Camera Lucida 6). This perseverance of the referent of the 
photograph and by extension of photography, a referent with the capital r for 
Barthes, thus defies signification-proper through its photographic mode of 
“always being there” (Barthes, Camera Lucida 6). In contradistinction, “every 
other image” is laden “from the start, and because of its status-by the way in 
which the object is simulated” (Barthes, Camera Lucida 5), that is, rendered
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‘nothing but code.’ Barthes thus can involve with a sound definition of the
essence of this disturbing -  in too many aspects of the term -  thing called the
photograph: “A specific photograph, in effect, is never distinguished from its
referent (from what it represents), or at least it is not immediately or generally
distinguished from its referent ...” {CameraLucida 5).
In Telling Flesh: The Substance o f the Corporeal, Vicki Kirby puts the
problem of the being (and Being) of the referent at the very heart of the
conception of the sign as conceived in structural terms. Although Saussure never
comes to definitive terms with the interruption the referent introduces at the center
of the relationship of the signifier with the signified, Kirby suggests, the
problematic nevertheless characterizes the origins of his discussion:
[i]f we grant that language precedes the referent rather than the 
other way around [as Saussure does before us] -  or, perhaps more 
accurately, i f  we think o f the referent as neither preceding nor 
following language because it is an immanence within it -  then the 
referent cannot be bracketed out of a Saussurean approach.
Although the referent’s status as the generative origin of meaning 
is certainly called into question, this does not imply that we can be 
entirely rid of the referent as a consequence. (19. Emphasis added.)
Following Kirby, it seems to be possible to argue that Barthes, who, along with 
“Benveniste, Lévi-Strauss ... and ... many of today’s post-modern and cultural 
critics,” would be expected to remain “captured in the structuralist aphorism 
‘language speaks us,”’ does a little more than “read this aphorism ... through a 
notion of language where linguistics mainframes all other data” (Kirby 54) in 
Camera Lucida^^. In this last essay by Barthes, the paradox that was announced in
My intention here has little to do with entertaining a dialogue through which a definitive, 
somewhat revisionist [and post-structuralist] leverage point would characterize the later Barthes, 
who would be understood, consequently, to suddenly turn into after having made the focal point of 
his study a relentless critique of mytiiologies for decades a ‘professor of desire.’ (For such 
discussions, see Lavers, Rabate, Shawcross, and Ungar). What demand notice, it seems to me, are 
the ways in which Barthes treats photography with a distinctive approach.
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“The Photographic Message” and that the photographic message is the expression 
of -  namely, the conception of a continuous sign -  is taken to an extreme wherein 
the ‘presence’ of the referent in the sign cannot be deflated by any means. The 
term continuous, then, it seems, could be better understood in this context as that 
which stands in distinction from the notions of the arbitrary and arbitration, with 
which structuralism has so often attempted “to separate the sign from reality,” 
taking it as the threshold with which to mark ‘the difference’ (Kirby 27)'^.
Although Saussure himself can be understood to have “inadvertently 
contradicted his own argument by including within the sign the reality to which 
the sign refers” (Kirby 19), confusedly equating and thus conflating what he 
termed the signified (i.e. the mental concept) with the thing itself (i.e. not only the 
sound-image, but also the referent), structuralism, as evident in the work of 
Benveniste as well Barthes, can be understood to be characterized by a relentless 
attempt to petrify “the sign’s integrity by differentiating it from a reality to which 
the human condition is prohibited access” (Kirby 20). In thinking on photography, 
however, Barthes seems to notice the rigidity of “[t]he parameters of this classical 
comprehension of the sign as something separable from the extralinguistic reality 
of matter” (Kirby 52). Indeed, in defining the photograph-as-sign as an entity that 
lays testimony to the irreducible duality of the sign, destroyed as soon as its two 
edges are thought of without one another, it appears that Barthes comprehends 
photography to violate the conception of the sign as conceived in linguistic terms, 
that is, as a well-rounded and ultimately close-ended unit of communication. 
Suggesting to envisage photography as a form of ‘carnal k n o w l e d g e a s  that 
which has to do with matter and body, Barthes appears to propose that the
See please the discussion on Victor Burgin’s approach to photography, above, in “Notes on Why 
Photographs do not Matter” and “Different Photographs/Differing Photographies”
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referential capacity of the photograph “is not so much a veiling or a mediation of 
the substantive realm from the formal as it is a partitioning -  an intricate and 
infinite fabric-ation” (Kirby 80).
In Burning with Desire: The Conception o f Photography, Geoffrey 
Batchen sets out to demonstrate that thought of and on photography have actually 
never been apart from a conflation of nature with culture. Citing a host of texts by 
people associated with its conception or invention as well as it later thinkers, 
Batchen aptly concludes that photography, as a production and a mode of 
production, resists being approached to in ways that would relate it to either of the 
terms that make up the nature/culture dichotomy singularly. As a matter of fact, it 
turns out that the question of photography’s identity, a question whose shadow 
seems to foreclose all other questions on photography, puts forward a reluctant 
posture to accounts that would restrict it as such. Confronting the thinker with a 
question that leads to many more rather than a crystal-clear answer, when 
interrogated, the history and ontology of photography asks in return: “Should the 
identity of photography be confined to the realm of nature or to that of culture?” 
(Batchen, Conception 21). Indeed, even before the time when the ‘idea’ of 
photography occurred to anyone, it appears, “nature had become irrevocably tied 
to human subjectivity” and nature and culture were already being thought of as 
“interconstitutive entities” (Batchen, Conception 62). This uncertainty as to where 
nature or culture could belong to when considered apart from each other, the 
“[rjecognition of the impossibility of either reconciling or separating nature from 
its other, culture,” is in fact, Batchen argues, parasitical to the frameworks in 
which those who experimented with trying to record images in a photographic
The terms is Geofreey Batchen’s. See “Carnal Knowledge.”
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manner before photography was finally announced to the public {Conception 62). 
On the other hand, when the initiatives that led to the idea and practice of 
photography are considered as important pre-cursors of thought on its identity, 
they also reveal further confusion as to the particular manner with which nature 
made its way, as it were, into the photograph. No one among Niepce, Talbot, 
Daguerre, or others that have been registered to take part in practices that led to 
photography, for instance, were able take an ultimate stand on whether nature was 
“painted by photography or being induced to paint herself,” or whether she was 
“produced by or a producer of photography” (Batchen, Conception 63). Rather, at 
the heart of the discourse evident in the writings and experiments of these ‘proto­
photographers,’ as Batchen calls them, an impossible definition that takes 
photography to simultaneously be “a mode of drawing and a system of 
representation in which no drawing takes place” {Conception 68) is uncovered. 
The nature that early thinking on photography had photography subjected to, then, 
cannot be understood as either a definitively active agent or a solidified, passive 
surface that is fair game for inscription. This convoluted formulation characterizes 
photography as well, itself a natural as well as cultural experience. The double 
take on the nature/culture binary photography has been involved with, 
furthermore, entails other, associated but equally fundamental binaries. Dualities 
like transience and fixity, space and time, subject and object can be understood to 
be articulated in the singular act that is dubbed photography, which actually is a 
term that profits from the simultaneous attendance of two ‘opposing’ edges: light 
(nature) and writing (culture). This productive dilemma, then, can be put at the 
very heart of photography’s origins, from where the desire to/of photography
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springs forth. Being the unexpected wonder Roland Barthes understands it to be^’, 
then, the invention and conception, or, better still, the discourse of photography 
can be considered to have put at issue “not just the theorization and depiction of 
nature, landscape, reflection, or the passing of time but, more fundamentally, the 
nature of representation and the constitution of existence itself’ (Batchen, 
Conception 100). No wonder that we find, then, that “wherever we look -  at 
photographic theory or at the medium’s history -  any given foundation is 
continually being displaced by a dynamic and troubling play of differences” 
(Batchen, Conception 21).
We have seen how the being of photogr^hy as sign, a being that in and of 
itself renders the sign/non-sign division problematic, would unavoidably 
complicate conventional notions that uncritically assume the concept of an 
outside-the-sign, in other words of an uninflected natural sphere that should 
nevertheless remain “unendorsable because unknowable” (Kirby 20). Since these 
notions, moreover, stem from an “understanding of identity and difference [that] 
takes these categories as oppositional, assuming that there is ... a presence and an 
absence -  an actual versus a potential” (Kirby 46), the violence that Barthes 
notices photography to take part in certainly cannot be limited to discourse that 
relates to and of photography per se, but extends or is found to interrupt the 
restrictions of discourse in general. However, because photography brings to 
surface view the irresolutions concentration on the concept of writing-in-general
It should perhaps be noted that the position of the “photographic image” as regards the 
nature/culture dichotomy occupies an important place for André Bazin as well as, or even before, 
Barthes. An investigation of Bazin’s equation of the affect involved in viewing a photograph with 
that involved in the interaction of the subject widi natural figures like a flower or a snowflake, for 
example, could certainly bring in an interesting dimension to the discussion advanced here. The 
reason why such a connection is not honored is the general historicist framework in which Bazin 
delineates his arguments and which seems to posit photography as a necessary step in the 
evolutionary Icgic that is supposed to govern the history of art and technology. For a discussion 
that reads Camera Lucida under the light of Bazin’s suggestions, see McCabe.
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is responsible for drawing attention to, a careful consideration devoted to it 
promises to be rewarding. Indeed, it seems that thought on photography could 
render it most evident that what is appreciated to be extramural to sign, (“[t]he 
‘stuff that is considered absent”), lies at the heart of “the process of the sign’s 
‘becoming sign’” and that it is “not simply absent any more than the sign is 
simply present” (Kirby 46-7), when it acts out of a determination to focus on what 
photography ‘is.’ On the other hand, the recognition that a conflation of the 
hierarchies the concept of the sign lays claim to is always already present around 
us certainly could not adequately explain the sources of that recognition in and of 
itself Although the explanation could indeed lie in the reason that we have 
merged the intelligible (culture) with the sensible (nature), “we still need to 
explain how this confusion is produced,” as Vicki Kirby is quick to add, even “[if] 
we admit that the difference between ‘concept’ and ‘reality’ is indeed blurred 
here” (13). To be able to do so, however, I would like to first turn to a primary 
aspect of Barthes’s discussion in Camera Lucida which have already been 
touched upon in the preceding section and that concerns the ‘Encounter’ or 
‘Tuché,’ particularly in relation to the notion of the ‘Real’ and to the ‘specter.’
3.2 The Real and the Specter
Barthes’s introductory conceptualization of the experience of ‘the Photograph’ as 
“what Lacan calls the Tuché, the Occasion, the Encounter, the Real, in its 
indefatigable expression” (Camera Lucida 4) later finds its place, although a 
precarious one, amidst the two edges of the framework that governs all 
photography: the ‘studium’ and the ‘punctum.’ These terms refer respectively to 
“a field of cultural interest” and an “unexpected flash which sometimes crosses
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this field” in the photograph which Barthes at first thought he “could distinguish” 
from each other (Camera Lucida 95-6). The definition of the punctum as a 
traumatic, wounding prick that makes its appearance “[a]s if direct vision oriented 
its language wrongly” (Barthes, Camera Lucida 53) certainly calls to mind the 
way in which the ‘Real’ is conceptualized in the Lacanian schema: “The real, or 
what is perceived as such, is what resists symbolization absolutely” (Lacan, 
“Discourse Analysis and Ego Analysis” 66-7).
The order of the Real in the triadic framework of arrangements Lacan sets 
up in understanding the subject and the psyche works first and foremost to 
construe the uneasy relationships between the other two orders in the triad. The 
Real is posited as a locus between the Symbolic and the Imaginary that cannot be 
assimilated to either of these orders but that deploys “a permanent agent of 
disharmony between them” (Bowie 94). Whereas, however, the Imaginary 
may keep a basis of activity even “in the heartlands of the Symbolic order” 
(Bowie 93), making it hard to install a coherently oppositional conception of the 
relationships between these two orders, the Real occupies a strangely invulnerable 
place in the triad, and a position supplementary to the engagement between the 
Symbolic and the Imaginary. Indeed, the Real could be taken to be the “suitably 
recalcitrant third term” Lacan feels the necessity to bring in to the framework that 
governs the subject in order that it is complete, and one that should be “handled 
with an acute sense of paradox -  with a sense indeed of the unthinkable being 
thought” (Bowie 102). The Real is unthinkable insofar as, of course, “the system 
of signs” is recognized as forming “a whole” in its very constitution, which 
consequently comes to mean “that it institutes an order from which there is no 
exit” (Lacan, “Truth Emerges from the Mistake” [hereafter “Truth”] 262). The
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agency of the Real for the constitution of the subject and the psyche, then, 
although very effective and concrete, remains that of an order aptly cloaked 
through the introduction of the Symbolic: “One can only think of language as a 
network, a net over the entirety of things, over the totality of the real. It inscribes 
on the plane of the real this other plane, which we here call the plane of the 
symbolic” (Lacan, “Truth” 262). Therefore the Real lingers behind and beyond 
the Symbolic order as “a world that falls entirely and irretrievably outside the 
signifying dimension” (Bowie 95). In other words, the conceptual schema with 
which Lacan explains the working of the psyche demands the necessity to 
acknowledge a sphere that shall be entitled “[t]he real as just as it is” (Lacan, 
“Truth” 271). Although “the passage of the thing onto the symbolic plane, thanks 
to which the truly human register comes into its own” is necessarily “destructive” 
of the ‘thing itself (Lacan, “Truth” 219), the symbolic register does not -  and at 
times cannot -  facilitate a complete effacement of the latter. More appropriately, 
whereas the dimensions of the order of the Real is considerable only to the extent 
that it is accessed under the authority and through the screen of the Symbolic, the 
former should be understood to exist necessarily as an order that is “identical to its 
existence” (Bowie 95). That is, as populated by the thing itself, in a form that 
defies the alienating attack of the signifier, always in its place. It hangs about, 
therefore, as “an uncrossable threshold” in the world of the subject (Bowie 106). 
On the other hand, occasions of contact between the subject and the Real, 
provided they are constrained by the guidance of the Symbolic, are fundamental 
for the unity of that world.
In understanding the subject’s mode of conduct with the Real under the 
constraint of the boundaries of the ‘human condition,’ Lacan turns to the
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Aristotelian opposition of Tuche versus Automaton. Although these two terms are 
conceptualized in the Lacanian schema as coextensive agencies, the former, as the 
encounter with the Real, is necessarily subsumed under the latter, which denotes 
the agency of the network of signifiers. The opposition further reveals that in the 
framework Lacan posits ‘“the real’ sounds rather like ‘nature’ and ‘signifiers’ 
suggests the presence of a human subject” (Bowie 102-3). Its set up demands that 
the tuche lies always “beyond the automaton, the return, the coming-back, the 
insistence of the signs,” and that its possibility exist independent of them (Lacan, 
“Tuche and Automaton” 53-4). The Real is thus unapproachable for the subject, 
or at least not willfully approachable, if not utterly ineffable. The subject’s 
encounters with the Real that Lacan’s tuche brings into the discussion of the 
psyche can therefore be understood to chance culminating in interruptive 
occasions wherein the latter interacts “with that which its structure cannot 
structure” (Bowie 103-4). The disturbing potential that the encounter announces 
and that the analyst should always bear in mind motivates Lacan, then, to 
investigate if it is
not remarkable that, at the origin of the analytic experience, the 
real should have presented itself in the form of that which is 
unassimilable in it -  in the form of the trauma, determining all that 
follows, and imposing on it an apparently accidental origin?
(Lacan, “Tuche and Automaton” 55)
It should be noted that whereas Lacan’s question appears to position the trauma at 
the heart of the Encounter, that is, while it seems to maintain the traumatic 
character of every encounter with the Real, it does not mean that the Lacanian 
schema makes room for understanding the fundamental distinction it sets up 
between the encounter and the trauma as a deconstructable one. The fact that 
encounters are “those radical points in the real” (“Tuche and Automaton” 55) for
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Lacan seems rather to bring to mind the agency of an option disguised under the
unity of the triadic network than an irreducible radicalism, except when the
traumatic is in question. For “allowing the structure of the Real to emerge against
the background of a primitive, undifferentiated All is not the same thing as being
able to name it, process it symbolically and put it to work for one’s own ends”
(Bowie 95). In that, ‘being in the real’ here denotes less a continuous contact with
the real than interacting with the Real under the authority of the word: that is,
‘being in the symbol.’ The trauma, then, is not an instance of the Encounter
among others but is a problematic occurrence of the latter that defies the recurring
weight of the Symbolic order. The subject is at home as long as encounters with
the real follow the guiding line of the symbol, and the Encounter therefore is not
in itself necessarily traumatic. However, the
subject who has all the elements of language at his disposition, and 
who has the possibility of making several imaginary moves that 
allow him to structure his world, might not be in the real. Why 
isn’t he in it? -  simply because things didn’t happen in a specific 
order. The figure is in its entirety upset. (Lacan, “The wolf! The 
Wolf!” 87)
The encounter with the real as a traumatic experience, reserved to the world of the 
psychotic is, then, an aspect of the subject who is not in the real. More 
appropriately, who is not in ‘real time.’ Anachrony, in other words the corrupt 
organization of things that do not happen in the order they ought to happen, 
speaks therefore of the trauma as the encounter with the real. It should, on the 
other hand, be remembered that it is the Symbolic that puts things in their right 
place as it intervenes in their unconstrained presence: “Everything begins with the 
possibility of naming” (Lacan, “The Object Relation and the Intersubjective 
Relation” 219). Considered as a radical slave of the symbolic, the Real in this
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framework thus comes to mean “the endlessly daunting power that Lacan ascribes 
to the Symbolic” (Bowie 95). Although it is the trauma that first turned the 
attention of psychoanalysis to “[t]he function of the tuche, of the real as encounter 
-  the encounter in so far as it may be missed, in so far as it is essentially the 
missed encounter” (Lacan, “Tuche and Automaton” 55), the former speaks of 
psychotic effects: of the agency of that which have escaped or been expelled from 
symbolization. The encounter in general, while necessarily of an accidental 
nature, turns out usually to contribute to the unity of the triad that governs the 
subject.
Disorders of two interrelative frameworks, on the other hand, seem to be
primarily responsible for governing the fundamentally disturbing, irreducibly
psychotic encounter: those of time and those of the Other. Roland Barthes
juxtaposes these disorders under a single paradigm in the name of the photograph:
life and death. The photograph certifies that
the corpse is alive, as copse: it is the living image of a dead thing.
For the photograph’s immobility is somehow the result of a 
perverse confusion between two concepts: the Real and the Live: 
by attesting that the object has been real, the photograph 
surreptitiously induces belief that it is alive, because of that 
delusion which makes us attribute to Reality an absolutely 
superior, somewhat eternal value; but by shifting this reality to the 
past (“this-has-been”), the photograph suggests that it is already 
dead. (Camera Lucida 79)
Just like the voice in the dream that wakes the subject up with its unmistakable 
iteration, the photograph in this context is positioned very much like the “accident 
that repeats an accident, an irreducible fragment of the real that speaks of 
irrecoverable loss, an encounter that is peremptory and brutal” (Bowie 106). 
Whereas tuche as the traumatic encounter that puts an end to the dream can never 
take place outside the dream, however, the photograph as tuche violates the
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opposition by way of its unconstrained, common existence and commerce. The 
encounter in the framework Barthes takes it up, therefore, is not exactly the 
surprising “tile falling on to the head of a passer-by” or the intrusive “knock on 
the door that interrupts a dream” (Bowie 103) of Lacan’s, but is rather reminiscent 
of the tile that is never tired of falling on the subject’s head or the arrhythmic 
knock that the subject wished was inaudible. Not the Real as “that which always 
lies behind the automaton” (Lacan, Tuche and Automaton 53-4), but the 
automaton that is so real as to beg the question: an automaton, in other words, that 
matters. Photography, then, as the “figuration of the motionless and made-up face 
beneath which we see the dead” (Barthes, Camera Lucida 32), comes close to a 
mask that is hard to tell apart but “that may always be hiding no living gaze 
beneath” it; the Thing concerned “mimes the living,” but it “is neither dead nor 
alive, it is dead and alive at the same time. It survives” (Derrida, Specters 153). 
The automaton and the tuche, then, come back together there in the specter, and 
are not distinguishable from each other and from the repetition of the sign, of the 
irreducibly repetitive sign that is the photograph, at least not clearly or 
immediately: “some ‘thing’ that remains difficult to name: neither soul nor body, 
and both one and the other” (Derrida, Specters 6). The specter is simultaneously 
as autonomous, traumatic and “unassimilable to the pursuit of pleasure as any 
foreign body encroaching upon the human organism” (Bowie 103), and as iterable 
as any product of signification, as any automaton is deemed to be. It reminds us 
not that the “network of signifiers in which we have our being is not all that there 
is, and the rest of what is may chance to break upon us at any moment”
(Bowie 103), as Lacan would have it, but rather that the latter habitually breaks 
upon the subject through the former. Amidst the presence of specters, therefore.
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the delirium that the Other’s slippage out of the signifying chain and in to the real 
is responsible for becomes commonplace rather than constitute a threshold 
between the orderly and the disorderly. As the appearing- disappearing 
appearance of the specter is made contemporary and its inclination to being 
marked is heard, it suddenly appears that the ‘time is out of joint.’ For the 
“spectral asymmetry interrupts here all specularity. It de-synchronizes, it recalls 
us to anachrony” (Derrida, Specters 6-7).
In Specters, Jacques Derrida begins to operate his discussion of the notion 
of the specter on the remains of a very famous instance of the latter: of the ghost 
of Hamlet’s father. This ghost, it would be remembered, like all specter, brings 
disorder to the State in too many senses that ‘something rotten’ should be declared 
to be in effect. Its unmistakable appearance orders that its coming about is 
marked, in an unfamiliar tone of voice. In that its presence, contrary to its 
appearance, follows not the father of Hamlet’s, the setter of order, but resembles 
the symbolically unbound Other, who is the condition of all alterity: “not a law­
maker but a tyrant, not one who maintains the threat of judicial punishment but 
one who exercises and withholds punishment in accordance with its own 
unfathomable whim” (Bowie 109-110). The displacement of the Name-of-the- 
Father, in other words the breeder of psychotic catastrophe, then, is here not 
restricted to the dimensions of the chronology of the signifying network as it is 
conceived in the Lacanian schema, but is borne despite the agency and at the heart 
of the latter. It is not possible anymore to speak only of the name of the father, but 
the being of the father, in a mode that defies proper names and beings alike, now 
complicates the schema in a way that challenges the order of presences and 
absences the Symbolic is supposed to put into motion.
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The juxtaposition m Hamlet of the repudiation of the Name-of-the-Father, 
of the irreducible anachronism that is associated with a fundamental disorder in 
the Symbolic (the bearer of correct time) with the ghost motivates Derrida to posit 
the latter at the center of the problem of being as it relates to time and substance. 
The radical move here concerns not so much that the ‘existence’ of the specter is 
such that “[o]ne cannot control its comings and goings,” just like the subject 
caught off-guard in Lacan’s tuché, but that the specter has to do, just like the sign, 
with a “question of repetition” (Derrida, Specters 11). As common and iterable as 
the automaton and as off the mark and substantial as the tuché, the ghost’s logic 
demands that thought of the historical event “exceeds a binary or dialectical logic, 
the logic that distinguishes or opposes effectivity or actuality (either present, 
empirical, living -  or not) and ideality (regulating or absolute non-presence)” 
(Derrida, Specters 63). The opposition between the spirit and the specter, that is, 
the dyadic relation between nature and culture which gives birth to the opposition 
between the tuché and the automaton, has a hard time standing up in the face of 
the spectral visit. “As soon as one no longer distinguishes spirit from specter, the 
former assumes a body, it incarnates itself’ and, at least momentarily, becomes 
indissoluble from the latter: in that the specter is “a paradoxical incorporation, the 
becoming-body, a certain phenomenal and carnal form of the spirit. [...] For it is 
flesh and phenomenality that give to the spirit its spectral apparition, in the very 
coming of the revenant or the return of the specter” (Derrida, Specters 6). 
Therefore the specter cannot, at least not easily, be treated through a logic of 
opposition that would counter it with “actual reality, living effectivity” in the way 
“vain appearances of the simulacrum” are habitually saluted against “real 
presence” (Derrida, Specters 47). The specter, then, ‘presents’ the trace of the
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Other in a particular way that it cannot be mistaken, without, however, going
anywhere near of assuring the unity of the self or the other. In its intangible
tangibility, the body of the specter is a
a proper body without flesh, but still the body of someone as 
someone other. And of someone other that we will not hasten to 
determine as self, subject, person, consciousness, spirit and so 
forth. This already suffices to distinguish the specter not only from 
the icon or the idol but also from the image of the image, from the 
Platonic phantasma, as well as from the simple simulacrum of 
something in general. (Derrida, Specters 7)
This inapparent appearance, the frequentiation that we call the ghost, in its 
difference from the simulacrum in general and the ‘good’ dead that remain dead, 
works and makes the spectator whom it does not get tired of visiting strive to 
work. For it seems it is almost impossible “to speak always o f the specter, to 
speak to the specter, to speak with it, therefore especially to make or let a spirit 
speak"  ^(Derrida, Specters 11), although it demands that it is spoken and given 
room and time to speak:
The one who has disappeared appears still to be there, and his 
apparition is not nothing. It does not do nothing. Assuming that the 
remains can be identified, we know better than ever today that the 
dead must be able to work. And to cause to work, perhaps more 
than ever. There is also a mode of production of the phantom, itself 
a phantomic mode of production. As in the work of mourning, 
after a trauma, the conjuration has to make sure that the dead will 
not come back: quick, do whatever is needed to keep the cadaver 
localized, in a safe place, decomposing right where it was 
inhumed. (Derrida, Specters 97)
And this is where, it seems, the being and work of photography, of the punctum in 
the photograph that pure contingency defines intervenes in the work of mourning, 
rendering its effort traumatic and ever incomplete. Its installation of the relation to 
the other shares the specter’s mode of existence in that it is determined by a 
“relation to time which itself would not be possible without surviving and
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returning, without that being ‘out of joint’ that dislocates the self-presence of the 
living present” (Derrida, Specters 154). It is here that we get closer to being able 
to define the scandal of photographic reference, which is not exactly that of a 
calling up of the past, not “to restore what has been abolished (by time, by 
distance) but to attest that what I see has indeed existed” (Barthes, Camera Lucida 
82), and to acknowledge the spacing involved by momentarily effacing it, 
rendering “what we see on paper ... as certain as what we touch” (88) and the 
being of what is not present as assured as what is present. For in the photograph it 
is necessarily “a real body, which was there” that sends “radiations which 
ultimately touch me, who am here.” Rendering the duration of the transmission 
insignificant because defied, “the photograph of the missing being ... will touch 
me like the delayed rays of a star” (Barthes, Camera Lucida 81), distinctly 
glowing in the here and now, dead in the there and then. The usual course of the 
thing, then, is reversed, or better still put out of its course, in the instant of this 
“strictly revulsive moment” (Barthes, Camera Lucida 119), and its former, which 
is to say formal, existence is interfered with. The photograph, while seeming to 
honor the figure of what is represents, “caricatures ... its very existence” (Barthes, 
Camera Lucida 115). But an “[ijrrepressible desire for identification” (Derrida, 
Specters 11) on the side of the spectator to whom the specter pays a visit 
interrupts this very opposition between figure and being as well. While the former 
is involved in “attempting to ontologize remains, to make them present, in the first 
place by identifying the bodily remains and by localizing the dead” (Derrida, 
Specters 9), the singularity of an alterity that cannot be anticipated and that efforts 
the identification before the spectator can even get there intervenes in the process. 
For in order to be able to identify the spectator needs to touch, but what he or she
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is dealing with here is “neither image nor reality, a new being, really: a reality one 
can no longer touch” (Barthes, Camera Lucida 87), a being that “resists the 
intuition to which it presents itself’ of being tangible (Derrida, “Spectrographies” 
115): “The subject that haunts is not identifiable, one cannot see, localize, fix any 
form, one cannot decide between hallucination and perception, there are only 
displacements; one feels oneself looked at by what one cannot see” (Derrida, 
Specters 136).
Before explicating in full what the ‘existence’ of specters means for the 
spectator-subject and for the unity of time, that is, before turning to spectrability 
as a necessary and common condition of the photographic image, and prior to 
spelling out that photographs can indeed be conceptualized to share in the 
untimeliness of specters, I would like to turn first to the ‘science’ of this new 
being. That is, to the ‘logic’ of the grapheme, simply because “deconstructive 
thinking of the trace, of iterability, of prosthetic synthesis, of supplemantarity,” in 
going beyond the oppositions the language of being and the being of language 
presumes, makes available those “means with which to take into account, or to 
render an account of, the effects of ghosts, of simulacra, of ‘synthetic images’
.. ..even if these take the novel forms to which modem technology will have given 
rise” (Derrida, Specters 75). The politics of technical reproduction as conceived 
by Walter Benjamin will also find due articulation in the framework of thought 
the next section attempts to hint at, in order that the relation of photography with 
history and time can be productively laid out.
79
3.3 Recognition and Iterability
It would be remembered that Barthes began his discussion of ‘the Photograph’ in 
Camera Lucida under the guidance of its reluctance to classification. He offered 
that the basis of this standard of being unclassifiable lied in photography’s 
indifference towards and among the “vast disorder of objects” (Camera Lucida 6). 
This standard in turn rendered all photographs equivalent, so that there was “no 
reason to mark this or that of its occurrences,” and since photography was 
consequently “deprived of a principle of marking,” its production and products 
remained “always invisible: it is not it that we see” (Barthes, Camera Lucida 6). 
On the one hand, this suggestion of invisibility on the part of Barthes have 
implicitly been taken here, since the concept and the being of the specter have 
been put at the heart of the discussion, to point towards the visibility of the 
invisible the ghost brings along. In other words, that the specter is evidential of 
the essential invisibility immeasurability of “visibility” itself, rendering it “beyond 
the phenomenon or beyond being” (Derrida, Specters 100). On the other hand, 
this introductory suggestion of Barthes can also be taken to open up a vein of 
discussion with which the ‘postmodern critique’ of photography seems to have 
been shot through, although implicitly, right from the start. The discussion 
concerns the relations and the presumed opposition between the concepts of use- 
value and exchange-value, and as the second chapter of this study tried to hint at, 
photography’s critics seem to habitually take this opposition for granted, asserting 
that photography is xxsQ-less. That is, that it could only thrive within the sphere 
and under the efficacy of exchange-value. Such an approach, as I tried to 
demonstrate, risks positing a field of existence that is populated by ‘pure’ objects 
of nature that become impure once they are endowed with exchange-value but are
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nevertheless imaginable, or, better still, intelligible, although humanly inhabitable. 
The discussion advanced here, on the other hand, has been marked by an attempt 
to grant first of all that
there is no pure use, there is no use-value which the possibility of 
exchange and commerce (by whatever name one calls it, meaning 
itself, value, culture, spirit [!], signification, the world, the relation 
to the other, and first of all the simple form and trace of the other) 
has not in advance inscribed in an out-of-use -  an excessive 
signification that cannot be reduced to the useless. (Derrida,
Specters 160. Brackets in original.)
This relationship of the commercial with which it does not intend to exchange but 
nevertheless gives way to occupies the heart of the discussion of the encounter 
between the aura and technical reproducibility of artworks Walter Benjamin 
introduces in “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction.” The 
latter, while representing the advancement of the capitalist mode of production, 
inadvertently posits a rupture in the world of the former, which, however, is a 
necessary component of the exploitation of the masses. Benjamin finds in the 
realization of this encounter, then, the mark of a historical fissure that should be 
relentlessly emphasized.
Very early in his “Work of Art” essay, Walter Benjamin declares the 
specifics of the theoretical fiction he is about to help unfurl. A fiction the 
tangibility of which is as extreme as Benjamin’s subject matter, the political 
directions it intends with extreme thoroughness are not the most frequently 
honored aspects of the essay. As is evident in his opening remarks, Benjamin 
seems less interested in proposing what could be termed a final resolution of truth 
in terms of the supposed evolutionary logic his subject matter would entail than 
the potentials that can be understood to flourish at the heart of historical 
discontinuity:
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Certain prognostic requirements should be met by these 
statements. However, theses about the art of the proletariat after its 
assumption of power or about the art of a classless society would 
have less bearing on these demands than theses about the 
developmental tendencies of art under present conditions of 
production. Their dialectic is no less noticeable in the 
superstructure than in the economy. It would therefore be wrong to 
underestimate the value o f such theses as a weapon. They brush 
aside a number of outmoded concepts, such as creativity and 
genius, eternal value and mystery -  concepts whose uncontrolled 
(and at present almost uncontrollable) application would lead to a 
processing of data in the fascist sense. (Benjamin, “The Work of 
Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction” [hereafter “Work of 
Art”] 218. Emphasis added).
In other words, the “Work of Art” essay could be understood to be further 
removed from the recollection of ‘wishful and technicist predictions’ it is 
sometimes taken to be if reconsidered as a political project that points to certain 
possibilities the characteristics of reproductive technologies and ‘mass 
movements’ could breach open. In this sense, Benjamin’s intentions appear to be 
more interesting than anything thinkers reviewed in the first part of this study has 
to offer as to possibilities of intervention in institutions of art and photography.
The fact that “the social significance” of the advent of reproductive 
technologies in their “most positive form ... is inconceivable without its 
destructive, cathartic aspect” (Benjamin, “Work of Art” 221) occupies a central 
place for Benjamin and distinguishes his suggestions from those that would 
operate on an assumption of the existence of immutable characteristics of 
photography, here fundamentally conceived as a matter of reproduction. In other 
words, Benjamin cannot be understood to simply theorize the novel associations 
related to reproductive technologies, which before long turn into practices of art, 
like photography, as eternally positive or negative. This becomes further evident
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once it is remembered that Benjamin is fully aware of “how the modem 
ambiguities can be manipulated for regressive ends” (“The Flaneur” 45). Neither 
can it be suggested that Benjamin posits a unidirectional relationship between 
technology and society, in other words that he is caught up in a simple gesture of 
technological determinism, precisely because Benjamin is interested in the age of 
mechanical reproduction as it is defined through an interaction of psychological, 
social, and historical currents. Rather, the source from where Benjamin’s 
suggestions stem in “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction” as 
in elsewhere appear to concern a radical reconsideration of the notions of subject 
and perception as well as history and historiography as they are at the verge of 
being redefined.
The suggestions Benjamin puts forward in relation to the thought of the 
subject and history in connection to the image and photography could hardly be 
indifferent to any study that would intend to displace assumptions of a stable 
relationship between these concepts. A closer consideration of the “Work of Art” 
essay, for example, reveals that Benjamin actually puts a strong emphasis on the 
changes that the viewer goes through in his or her relationship with objects of art, 
and in particular as these interactions relate to photography. As Samuel Weber 
notes, the mass of subjects Benjamin speaks of does not consist simply of a 
massed version of traditional, ‘contemplative’ individuals. Indeed, “[t]he shift 
from the uniqueness of the original work of art to ‘copies’ which from the very 
start are made to be reproduced and exhibited” that Benjamin devotes much 
attention to “involves not just the substitution of one kind of work for another but 
rather a modification in the way works of art quite literally take place” (Weber 85.
See Tagg, “The Prof of the Picture” 98.
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Italics omitted). Benjamin himself announces his primary interest as an 
investigation into the new (i.e. modem) processes through which “[t]he 
adjustment of reality to the masses and of masses to reality” (“Work of Art” 223) 
is negotiated. At the very moment when subject/object relations are being 
rearranged and mapped onto new constraints, such processes interrupt those 
rearrangements whenever they approach closure. What Benjamin names 
“contemporary masses” are indeed characterized by a certain desire; a “desire ... 
to bring things ‘closer’ spatially and humanly,” as they bend “toward overcoming 
the uniqueness of every reality by accepting its reproduction’' (“Work of Art”
223. Emphasis added.), in line with the rupture of the “classical models of vision 
in the early nineteenth century” that “was inseparable from a massive 
reorganization of knowledge and social practices that modified in myriad ways 
the productive, cognitive, and desiring capacities of the human subject” (Crary 3). 
“Uniqueness and permanence,” therefore, are here “as closely linked” in the 
experience of the unarmed eye with the image it registers rather than solely in that 
image, “as are transitoriness and reproducibility” characteristic not only of the 
reproduced image but the experience of the viewer with it as well. The subject of 
the age of mechanical reproduction, then, cannot be understood to be governed by 
currents less dynamic then its object, and what fascism represents for Benjamin is 
precisely an effort as such to petrify those currents and the subject in its 
relationship to the image. Therefore, it would not be entirely off the mark, it 
seems, to suggest that the age Benjamin has in mind is one that the characteristics 
of subjects and objects are conflated, in the context precisely of technological 
reproduction. For it is a context when time renders objects to be ‘reactivated’ and 
causes the subject to get caught within “his own particular situation” (Benjamin,
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“Work of Art” 221). The fact that the representation or visual experience of 
nature and art is no longer an act of passive contemplation but starts to entail an 
active and constitutive mode of consciousness at the age of reproduction, in other 
words ‘the withering of aura,’ therefore, cannot be a matter solely of technological 
reproduction, but concerns also the counterpart of its products, namely, the 
perceptive dimensions of the subject. And this is how, it appears, the suggestion 
that “the instant the criterion of authenticity ceases to be applicable to artistic 
production, the total function of art is reversed [:] [ijnstead of being based on 
ritual, it begins to based on another practice-politics” (Benjamin, “Work of Art” 
224) could be better understood. The practice-politics Benjamin has in mind 
involves the productive agency of the photograph as well as its viewer in the 
experience of photography. In other words, the difference between the subject 
“who concentrates before a work of art” and the one who is ‘distracted,’ although 
it is a difference that cannot be understood to be final, concerns that the latter is 
‘concerned’ with it, unlike the former who is ‘absorbed’ (Benjamin, “Work of 
Art” 239).
Perhaps it should be mentioned at this point that the relations of the subject 
with the object (not only the image or the photograph, but also the referent) and 
the production of that object lies at the center of Barthes’s discussions in Camera 
Lucida as a category as important as Benjamin’s main thrust of argument in “The 
Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction” suggests^^. Interested as it 
is with a project quite different from Benjamin’s, particularly in that it sees 
Barthes pose as a carnal measure of photographic knowledge (9) and under the
My intention here has less to do witii a ‘comparison’ of Benjamin and Barthes than an attempt to 
articulate a web of relationships between certain terms that their respective works on photography 
emphasize. For examples of a discussion which would read these thinkers’ works in (somewhat 
direct) relation to each other, however, see Dant and Gilloch; and Haverkamp.
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guidance of the consciousness of his feelings (10), Camera Lucida centers around 
the viewer of the photograph as a perpetuator -  simultaneously active and passive 
-  of photographic relationships. In addition to acclaiming the responsibility of the 
viewer in photography, however. Camera Lucida shows an interest in making 
clear that the experience of photography complicates assumptions of an 
indifferential bondage between the terms of the subject/image pair. Barthes is 
unsure as to what he could expect of photographs that feature his own: does his 
interest concern that his “(mobile) image, buffeted among a thousand shifting 
photographs, altering with situation and age, should always coincide with ... [his] 
(profound) ‘self,’” or “is it the contrary that must be said: ‘myself never 
coincides with my image; for it is the image which is heavy, motionless, stubborn 
... and myself which is light, divided, dispersed” {Camera Lucida 12)? Without a 
doubt, what concerns Barthes here has more to do with a subject-image and an 
image-subject than either the subject or the image considered in isolation. What 
photography thrives in for Barthes can be understood, consequently, to involve a 
conflation of the subject (as an agent of effective presence) with the photograph 
itself. Not only does photography transform the “subject into object” (Barthes, 
Camera Lucida 13), as was mostly evident at the time of its advancement when 
“during the considerable period of the exposure, the subject as it were grew into 
the picture (Benjamin, “A Small History of Photography” [hereafter 
“Photography”] 245); and not only does the subject “make another body” in order 
to constitute himself/herself‘differently’ once he/she feels the observation of the 
camera, transforming “in advance into an image” (Barthes, Camera Lucida 10). 
Photography, moreover, causes its subject to experience an unease wherein his 
command of his or her own presence slips out of hand through the mode of
8 6
‘deferred presence’ that is the photograph. Roland Barthes sees it “alter the 
precious essence of my individuality: what I am, apart from any effigy” (Camera 
Lucida 11-2). “[A] cunning dissociation of consciousness from identity” (Barthes, 
Camera Lucida 11-2), photography leaves him naked at the mercy of the other’s 
concern, hoped to blossom at some time and place deferred. The notion of 
evidence that the discourse of photography posits, then, it seems, can be 
understood to be closer to a sort of “awful evidence that perhaps we are not or 
where we think ourselves to be” more than an unproblematic one, and the subjects 
of photographs, those observed and observers alike, could also be considered 
prone to an equally troubling question: “what does it mean when the body that is 
written upon signs itself, when a symptom ‘speaks,’ or when an object possesses 
us?” (Kirby 59).
Contrary to what appears at first sight, Barthes’s insistence in Camera 
Lucida on the intractability of the photographic referent in ‘being there’ never 
amounts to denying “the applicability of this logic of the mark [or ‘iterability’] to 
photography” (Wike 2). Neither is the ecstasy Barthes has ‘in mind,’ strictly 
speaking, is the very same as the “fascination of writing” (Haverkamp 268). His 
fascination in the photographic event, however, could be better grasped as less an 
effort in opposing “citation or iteration to the noninteration of an event” than in 
acknowledging photography within a layout of “differential typology of forms of 
iteration” (Derrida, “Signature, Event, Context” 326). Fascination as a strategy of 
critique occupies an important place in terms also of the framework in which 
Benjamin approaches photography: it “involves seeing a dialectical relation 
between the image and history” rather than mere absorption (Abbas 56).
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Some strange things occur to Barthes as he cannot make himself out of his 
own photograph, or comes over photographs that he cannot recall having been 
taken, poses he cannot remember having put himself into. Looking at the 
photograph of oneself, then, Barthes seems to suggest, a subject goes through an 
irresolution that can be put thus: seeing myself not seeing myself First, the ‘self 
that he wants to construct as he is being photographed, as he is posing, is invisible 
to himself: it is not present to himself, which is to say that one is not present to 
himself/herself when being photographed, in pre-photographic form. Second, 
Barthes-as-photograph is not seeing Barthes-as-viewer: it is someone else, an­
other, that sends his gaze to Barthes in the photograph, although it looks very 
much like Barthes himself. These are the beginnings of an argument wherein the 
photographed and consequently photography is defined as the ''''Spectrum’" 
(Barthes, Camera Lucida 9). Specters, it would be remembered, are spotted 
through the recognition that “they are deprived of a specular image, of the true, 
right specular image [...] How do you recognize a ghost? By the fact that it does 
not recognize itself in a mirror” (Derrida, Specters 155-6). More importantly, 
however, this aspect of the ghost effect brings to the discussion a question that 
concerns more than the ‘properly spectral:’ Who is not so deprived?
Like a kid who has trouble in having done with the ‘mirror phase,’ Barthes 
can be heard swearing that no photographs can ever ‘feature’ him, and no degree 
of resemblance will ensure him that photographs can ‘restore’ him to himself. 
However, he cannot deny having been photographed either, for the principle by 
which photographs are produced acquaints him with the ‘stupefying evidence’ of 
the ‘that-has-been.’ A discussion that is as troublesome for Barthes as it is for his 
followers, then, is set in motion, wherein what Barthes appositely terms ‘the
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essence of photography’ has to do not with ‘4ruth-to-appearance” but rather with 
‘4ruth-to-presence, a matter of being (of something’s irrefutable place in 
space/time) rather than resemblance” (Batchen, Conception 193). In difference to 
what appears at first sight, however, the discussion of the ‘noeme’ of photography 
Barthes entertains in Camera Lucida has less to do with installing an 
incontrovertible photographic continuity of presence within absence than 
interrogate, at least intuitively, an ultimate opposition between these two terms:
“it is not simply because there is something real that is undecomposable”
(Derrida, “Spectrographies” 123)^ ®.
Strange couplings befall the photograph as Barthes defines it. The first, 
from which the others spring, is that “[w]hat the Photograph reproduces to infinity 
has occurred only once: the Photograph mechanically repeats what could never be 
repeated existentially” (Camera Lucida 4). In that, photography concerns a certain 
defiance: by reproducing some-thing that is (was) not meant to be reproduced, it 
calls to question whether it was (had been) not reproducible in the first place. 
Barthes has his way of dealing with/sidestepping this (ill)logic, this madness that 
he himself introduces into the theory of photography, which will receive due 
respect in the next few pages. Let it suffice here to elaborate on the power of the 
tear that splits him. As the sequence of photography, the sequence of photographs 
that leads Barthes to his deceased mother that he ‘meditates’ through carries him 
closer to the impossible, the impossibility of finding the single being he thought 
on earth would not give itself to reproducibility in a photograph, as photograph, 
Barthes experiences serious trouble. When photographs of her mother seem to 
remain short of interrupting the beloved, necessarily past presence of her mother.
For arguments that seem to suggest the contrary, see Bürgin, “Re-reading Camera Lucida” and 
“Diderot, Barthes, Vertigo;” and Wike.
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Barthes is at home. It is not necessarily distressing to say, then, confronted with a 
certain ‘indifferent’ picture of her mother, “[tjhat’s not the way she was at all” 
{Camera Lucida 66). As long as that regime of irreproducibility is maintained in 
the name of the photograph, as long as the sign of Being-as-presence remains 
undivided, photography can indeed be understood to be indifferent among other 
‘systems of representation.’ To feel, confronted with a certain photograph, “That’s 
almost way she was!” {CameraLucida 66), however, marks for Barthes the 
outcome of a structural anxiety which in fact returns to mark every photograph. 
The problems slip out of control when the photographic referent starts to “protest 
its former existence” {Camera Lucida 89). When at last Barthes ‘rediscovers’ her 
mother in a photograph, it is, then, utter catastrophe: It suddenly appears that the 
photograph of Barthes’s mother comes before ‘her,’ and this in more than one 
sense.
As Barthes begins digging for not The Mother but his mother inside a 
group of photographs that invariably feature her, he is hopeful that no errors will 
interrupt the banal flow of this excavation. “[T]he essential question [that] first 
appeared: did I recognize her?” {Camera Lucida 65) is fearsome in that it could 
call forth a positive answer. Yet the only photograph Barthes manages to 
recognize his mother features her as a little kid Barthes could not be expected to 
have had any acquaintance or ‘contact’ with in the usual sense. Under the 
influence of what Derrida calls a “ghost effect,” wherein the difference between 
the spirit and the specter tends to disappear {Specters 125-6), and thus desiring to 
put the spirit back into the specter or the specter back onto the spirit, as it were, he 
attempts to resolve the conflict involved in this recognition that is far from being 
cognitive through the personal evidence of a mode of presence of her mother’s
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that is anterior to her death and posterior to the photograph in question, but whose 
tangible grasp is nevertheless ‘still present’ for him. In striving to let the dead 
bury their dead, then, Barthes tries to convince us that this act of recognition he 
stepped into, in which her mother happened to him under the ‘guise’ of a five year 
old girl, should have something to do with the fact that her mother, in the last 
period of her life, indeed became something of a child for him. Since the whole 
procedure is overwhelmed by the fact that Barthes could only have come to even 
believing that the little girl featured in the photograph is her mother as-a-five- 
year-old through a comparison with other photographs belonging to her 
childhood, and since his endeavor in its entirety is under the sign of a lack of 
recognition of the ‘object’ of photography through its ‘original’ features, however, 
we remain unconvinced, as much as Barthes himself is. There is, furthermore, an 
aspect to this récognitive performance that entraps Barthes-the-spectator between 
finding and missing the ‘soul’ of her mother in the photograph. The ghost that the 
incarnation of the spirit in the picture produces “is in turn negated, integrated, and 
incorporated by the very subject of the operation who, claiming the uniqueness of 
its own human body, then becomes ... the absolute ghost”; for the specter 
involves, if it is to be possessed, becoming “possessed by it, possessed period,” 
and thus confuses the opposition of the specter to the non-specter ((Derrida, 
Specters 127; 132).
The procedure through which Barthes discovers her mother in the 
photograph demands some more consideration. Keeping in mind that the punctum 
of Barthes’s photography -  that quiet unclassifiable feature in a photograph and 
consequently in all photography that comes to define the noeme of photography in 
the end -  concerns “what I add to the photograph but what is nevertheless there”
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(Camera Lucida 55), we should perhaps focus on the curiosities involved in this 
procedure rather than ‘leave them to the psychoanalyst. ’ In that regard, Barthes’s 
insistence that being and appearance should be left uninterrupted of each other 
produces results interruptive of that very opposition itself. In those photographs of 
his mother that leaves Barthes only generally affected, a particular mode of banal 
presence that is defined by an absence blossoms. ‘According’ to those 
photographs, Barthes relates of recognizing their object, the object of 
photography, only partially, finding sometimes “a region of her face, a certain 
relation of nose and forehead, the movement of her arms, her hands” (Camera 
Lucida 66). Amidst the attendance of fragments that do not add up, and not quite 
able to break through this fragmentary mode of recognition, Barthes is convinced 
that he missed in these photographs the ‘being’ of the beloved, that is, missed her 
‘altogether,’ just like in all photography the essence of being is missed. These 
‘ordinary’ photographs, however, are opposed to the ‘Winter Garden Photograph,’ 
in which Barthes’s mother’s being is revealed, on the condition of a strange 
principle. It pertains to a totality, which indeed bring together connotations of a 
binary by which the suppression of the fragmentary would operate, and the 
perpetuation of an originary, total being would be presumed. What is surprising is 
that Barthes declares the memory of her mother to be just as photographic, just as 
fragmentary to him in the first place. He notes that, “conversely,” what had sent 
him “back” to these photographs is an already overwhelming “suppression or 
partial alteration” of “all the possible predicates from which my mother’s being 
was constituted” (Camera Lucida 70), which the Winter Garden Photograph 
“collected.” The congruity that this particular picture evidences, this ‘accord’ that 
it hits atone of between Barthes and his mother-as-five-year old, then, is “so
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abstract in relation to an image” {Camera Lucida 69-70), at least the reproductive 
image, at the same time as it is possible only in relation to the photographic image 
and its mode of being. It appears that without evoking the very fragmentary 
‘nature’ of the being it touches at first, in other words, Barthes’s precious 
photograph cannot operate. The totality the Winter Garden Photograph can offer 
for Barthes is equivalent to and can be as total only as “an infinite series of 
adjectives {Camera Lucida 69-70)” serialized in disorderly fashion. It can defy the 
mode of production that accompanies it, that is, insofar as it makes it possible.
The ‘punctum’ in Barthes’s terminology has as a matter of fact been an 
effect of the partial feature from the very start. This partial feature that Barthes 
could not quite put his finger on, however, never gave in to a totality: it stood in 
opposition to what Barthes termed the ‘studium,’ conceived as the (‘original’) 
context of either the photograph or the referent, or “a field of cultural interest” 
which Barthes at first “thought” he “could distinguish ... from that unexpected 
flash which sometimes crosses this field” {Camera Lucida 95-6). However the 
very naming of the photograph of which Barthes established a ‘real’ yet ‘simply 
visual’ accord, for example, now puts this opposition into danger. It is the ‘Winter 
Garden Photograph,’ rather than the ‘Photograph of My Mother.’ Moreover, 
although Barthes sets out to find not The Mother but mother, not a figure but a 
being, not a being but a soul, he cannot ensure that these categories can be hold in 
absolute opposition to each other in the process. Barthes’s attempt to discharge 
the “ghostly debt” and rather restitute the pictures to their referent, “render them 
to their rightful owner” (Derrida, “Restitutions of the Truth in Pointing” 258) 
turns out to be a necessarily difficult task.
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In a similar vein, the ways in which the opposition between studium and
punctum that Barthes sets up in Camera Lucida comes to collapse can also be
found in the flow of the very text that erects it. As Barthes started earlier to
attempt at providing us with instances wherein the punctum-as-partial-yet-
fugitive-feature, rising “from the scene, shoots out of it like an arrow,” piercing
the unexpecting viewer {Camera Lucida 26), he had to oppose it to the stadium,
which could be defined thus in relation to a particular photograph, by Van der
Zee, of a “family of American blacks:”
I am sympathetically interested, as a docile cultural subject, in 
what the photograph has to say, for it speaks (it is a “good” 
photograph): it utters respectability, family life, conformism,
Sunday best, an effort of social advancement in order to assume 
the White Man’s attributes ... The spectacle interests me but does 
not prick me. (Camera Lucida 43)
What disturbs Barthes here, on the other hand, turns out ultimately to by no means 
be distinguishable from the banal, stereotypic interest the scene invites. It pertains 
to “[t]he belt worn by the sister (or daughter),” whom Barthes does not refrain 
from calling “the ‘solacing Mammy’ -  whose arms are crossed behind her back 
like a schoolgirl, and above all her strapped pumps (Mary Janes -  why does this 
dated fashion touch me?)” (Camera Lucida 43).
In distinguishing the punctum from the stadium, “[s]ome soldiers with 
nuns behind them” serves Barthes to make his point (Camera Lucida 47). These 
elements are featured in a photograph by Koen Wessing, part of a study on the 
1979 Nicaragua rebellion, and claiming to a duality: “the co-presence of two 
discontinuous elements, heterogeneous in that they did not belong to the same 
world” (Barthes, Camera Lucida 23). Barthes therefore installs this opposition 
wherein two sorts of recognition or affect can be split from each other. The first.
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stadium, concerns the familiar, the homely, referring to “a classical body of 
information” and its regular signs, operating at the “rational intermediary of a 
political and ethical culture” {Camera Lucida 25-6). The second, punctum^^ has 
to do with a certain yet fugitive mark, “made by a pointed instrument” {Camera 
Lucida 26). It disturbs, dislocates and punctuates the work of the stadium. Like a 
soldier, it wounds the guerrilla the nuns just recovered or aim to recover, or, better 
still, like a nun, it recovers the little boy in the picture the soldiers thought they 
killed. The center of the analogy, nevertheless, remains that no nuns are allowed 
to circulate as health care officials without some soldiers accompanying them. In 
other words, no guerrilla warfare will be ever carried out without some nuns and 
soldiers circulating around at the same time. Barthes therefore goes on to find a 
punctum in so many different photographs that occupies the picture even before 
the stadium gets there, preceding it, breaking its totality into pieces before it can 
reach closure.
The stadium, then, in giving itself up to, or even intending to ‘the name,’ 
to the Law of language and linguistics, as it were, “cannot really prick me” 
(Barthes, Camera Lucida 51) and stands erect in the picture insofar as it is in 
difference from the punctum. The latter “is a good symptom of disturbance” 
(Barthes, Camera Lucida 51) in that it resists being named or even being 
ultimately located. Barthes knows of it, senses it, perceives the referent and 
recognizes it with his “whole body” {Camera Lucida 45) through this opening that
punctum  is also: sting, speck, cut, little hole” (Barthes, Camera Lucida 27). Punctum, it 
seems, have etymological links not only witfi the above and with punctuation, but also with 
punctuality, being ‘on’ time. Moreover, the word is a variant of the Latin “punctura,” that is, 
“puncture” in English: perforation, piercing, stabbing, penetration. The equivalence of the term 
with the French “pointure,” pointing, are exploited in the polylogue Jacques Derrida sets up in 
“Restitutions of the Truth in Pointing” in regard to the series of ‘shoe paintings’ by Van Gogh. 
Although the polylogue in question would certainly resists such banal reduction, let us note in 
passing that it seems the pointing in relation to the ‘referent’ in painting, performed here by the
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breaks the skin of the photographed, the photograph and the viewer, but has 
trouble coming to terms with it. “The effect is certain but unlocatable, it does not 
find its sign, its name; it is sharp and yet lands in a vague zone of myself; it is 
acute yet muffled, it cries out in silence” (Barthes, Camera Lucida 52-3). In trying 
to overwhelm it by description, Barthes goes from photograph to photograph, 
from punctum to punctum, from studium to punctum and punctum to studium, and 
does not seem able to choose an inhabitable point amidst the oscillation of these 
so many points. Even in a single photograph, the one by Van der Zee cited above, 
the “floating flash” {Camera Lucida 52-3) does not seem to allow Barthes to hold 
the punctum under total illumination. It remains as the outrageous ineffability that 
makes all photography possible, and in that, it is ‘bound’ by the very logic of the 
mark: “it occurs in the field of the photographed thing like a supplement that is at 
once inevitable and delightful; it does not necessarily attest to the photographer’s 
art; it says only that the photographer was there” (Barthes, Camera Lucida 47). 
However, its very existence complicates also the conventional notions by which 
the agency and the being of the photographer in the ‘production’ of photography 
are conceived. The agency of the punctum toils against the efficacy of the 
photographer: photographs that seem to Barthes to resist the ‘illumination’ of the 
punctum suffer from the latter’s ‘intervention’ in the former. Certain details that 
fail to constitute a punctum are thus disregarded, “doubtless because the 
photographer has put them there intentionally” {Camera Lucida 47). In that, 
Barthes prefers to relate the partiality of the punctual to the fact that the 
photographer “could not not photograph the partial object at the same time as the 
total object” {Camera Lucida 47).
viewer-scholar, leaves unbounded, ‘half-laced’ the life-cycle of the object of painting, while in 
photography the pointing does not seem to escape the history of the referent.
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The photographic context, be that the pre-photographic scene or the 
context in which the photograph is viewed, therefore, like all ‘communicative’ 
context, remains through the punctum’s labor one whose determination “is never 
certain or saturated,” resisting absolute determination (Derrida, “Signature, Event, 
Context [hereafter “Signature”] 310).
In bringing “Signature, Event, Context” together with Camera Lucida, my 
aim has less to do with aligning photography with writing-in-general in any 
manifestly associative sense, or suggesting that one comes before the other or 
circumscribes it. The point is that the theory of the latter could be quite beneficial 
for thinking about the former, and stress on the ‘existence’ of the former could 
introduce new questions and complications for thought on writing as well . The 
parallels could be articulated productively particularly around the notion of 
intention in writing and in photography, unless Derrida’s point in “Signature” is 
understood to mean, as speech-act theorists seem to have done, that 
‘communication’ is governed by the solemn authority of conscious intentions , or 
Barthes’s argument in Camera Lucida is taken to stem from the culmination of 
“an increasing effort on Barthes’s part to eliminate all forms of intentionality from 
the photograph” '^^ . Intentionality in this context turns out to be conceived in 
difference from cases wherein it is conventionally totalized “into self-presence 
and self-possession” (Spivak 80). It is thus not only the “the ever-necessary 
possibility of the writer/reader’s absence to the context, but the claim of the
This second aspect is not of particular focus here. For such focus, see Cadava; Havelkamp; and 
Derrida, “Deaths of Roland Barthes,” where he is reported to suggest, after many precautions, that 
all signs could be understood to involve a punctum or an aspect thereof (Batchen 211). This text, 
unfortunately, has not been accessible to me in the preparation of this study.
See Spivak on this point, particularly p. 83.
Comment, Bernard. R oland Barthes, vers le neuter, qtd. in Burnett 37.
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writer/reader’s presence to himself in certain privileged contexts” (Spivak 80) as 
well that is at stake here.
The peculiarities photography represents for Barthes appear certainly to 
qualify it for him as a case where “we are dealing neither with a semantic or 
conceptual content, nor with a semiotic operation, and even less with a linguistic 
exchange” (Derrida, “Signature” 309). Barthes’s interest in photography, first and 
foremost, speaks to a certain particularity in that it is charged with fascination.
This affect, however, does not have much to do with the general categories of art- 
talk, and precedes the ‘author’ of the photograph in that it is established 
exclusively between the photograph (and the photographed) and the viewer. 
Neither does it pertain to what that discourse has to say on photography. In other 
words, it is negligent of if not alien to terms like ‘the harmony of the frame,’ ‘the 
genius of the photographer,’ ‘rarity of the referent,’ ‘element of surprise,’ ‘essence 
of our culture,’ ‘beauty of nature,’ and so on. Its power renders Barthes at once 
unable to “accede to that notion which is so convenient when we want to talk 
history, culture, aesthetics -  that notion known as an artist’s style” {Camera 
Lucida 18). Barthes, of course, as is well known, is responsible for ‘killing’ the 
author as early as 1968. Announcing that “the birth of the reader must be required 
by the death of the Author” (55), Barthes associates the thus refutable existence of 
the latter with the advent of modernist criticism with indispensable links in “The 
Death of the Author.” Writing is here defined as “the destruction of every voice, 
of every origin,” “the black-and-white where all identity is lost, beginning with 
the very identity of the body that writes” (49)^ .^ As that operation which makes,
A review of Barthes’s arguments in the “Death of the Author” with the notion of writing as 
advanced by Derrida in mind would certainly be a productive endeavor, particularly in that 
Barthes alludes here to the category of the performative speech-act. This would, however, be 
exceeding the confines of this study.
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that is, a self-present author increasingly difficult to locate in the text. Similarly, 
Barthes can be followed in Camera Lucida to definitively displace the notion of 
the artist or author in photography, resisting its ultimate agency. Not only are 
photographs that call attention to the labor of the photographer in putting things in 
and out of their place abandoned, but neither is the possibility of aggregating 
photographs by a single photographer with each other is entertained. Perhaps 
more importantly, however, Barthes also establishes through the ‘lack’ of the 
photographer the desire he utters of being a “primitive” {Camera Lucida 7) at the 
face of photographs, of being negligent in photography of everything except the 
‘presence’ of the referent it lays claim or ‘testifies’ to. Indeed, Barthes installs a 
framework for the photograph in Camera Lucida that has to invite that which 
disturbs that framework:
It is rather as if I had to read the Photographer’s myths in the 
Photograph, fraternizing with them but not quite believing in them.
These myths obviously aim (and this is what myth is for) at 
reconciling the Photograph with society (is this necessary? -  Yes, 
indeed: the Photograph is dangerous) by endowing it with 
functions, which are, for the Photographer, so many alibis. These 
functions are: to inform, to represent, to surprise, to cause to 
signify, to provoke desire. (28)
Barthes therefore renders incomplete at once, it seems it could be argued, 
aspirations both of modernist formalism (i.e. ‘artist unbound of context’) and 
postmodernist critique (i.e. ‘photographer as nothing but context’). The dangerous 
in the photograph, that unexpected flash, is reluctant to the caption, the 
unconscious or conscious designations of the photographer or of ‘ideology’ 
conceived as an extrinsic stream of force, other texts that surround it in every 
sense, linguistic determinations, etc. without, however, standing in stark 
opposition to them. In that, photography seems here to share with writing an
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important act of disqualification. This disturbance that the being of and in 
photography brings about to the playground of ‘communication’ concerns “‘real’ 
or ‘linguistic’” contexts at the same time, leaving their ‘empirical saturation’ 
anything but complete (Derrida, “Signature” 316). Perhaps more importantly, 
however, this interruption holds true in the case also of what is to be denied to the 
context of communication, to the beyond-or-behind-the-sign, to that which would 
have nothing to do with the photographic sign if not the sign-in-general, in other 
words, “for the entire field of what philosophy would call experience, that is, the 
experience of Being: so-called ‘presence’ (Derrida, “Signature” 316-7).
Contrary to what appears at first sight, then, Barthes’s articulation of the 
essence of photography, of the ‘that-has-been,’ has less to do with qualifying 
photography as a means of access to the ‘origin’ of the absent entity it ‘includes’ 
than the acknowledgment of an irreducible spacing, in the sense of a “disruption 
of presence in the mark” (Derrida, “Signature 327), of “a critique of presence” 
(Spivak 101), in general as the corruptibility of every originary presence, of 
originality itself The ‘discourse’ of photography testifies to the presence of the 
referent, its existence “in this place which extends between infinity and the 
subject {operator or spectator),"' but does so through a certain, dispersive 
operation: the referent in photography “has been here, and yet immediately 
separated; it has been absolutely, irrefutably present, and yet already deferred” 
(Barthes, Camera Lucida 77). It should probably be noted that this space in which 
the referent of the photograph ‘exists’ and the labor of spacing that no 
photography could operate in exclusion of are not among the most frequently 
focused aspects of the photograph. In writing, too, “[sjpacing is always the 
unperceived, the non-present, and the non-conscious” (Derrida, O f Grammatology
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68). Thus the necessity of the ‘alibis’ of the photograph: the contingency that 
occupies the heart of the photograph demands that photography do not “signify 
(aim at a generality) except by assuming a mask,’’ that is, “what makes a face into 
the product of a society and of its history” (Barthes, Camera Lucida 34), and what 
does not allow room for being simply removed from that face.
The reasons why every photograph should be a mark of ‘sovereign 
contingency,’ an undeniable error, should begin to start appearing clearer now. 
Since what the viewer does with it, carrying it outside of any generality, what he 
or she ‘intentionalizes,’ as Barthes has it, has more to do with “Reference” than 
either “Art or Communication” (Camera Lucida 77), photography cannot be told 
to operate solely under the sign of the absolute determination in which it is found. 
This order of reference, the loaded evidence of the referent that is the photograph, 
however, does not simply extend an original context that is the context of the 
founding referent. Even before it can establish, let alone announce, a certain 
operation of contiguity with its referent, it has to acknowledge its not only future, 
but also past and present absence. Rather than merely authorize a mechanical 
economy wherein it would simply succeed in abbreviating access to signs that 
carry the sterile marks of their origin or effacing them altogether, it first and 
foremost suffers under the mark of that which risks “introducing a certain break in 
the homogeneity of the system” (Derrida, “Signature” 312) that qualifies, 
however, the entirety of its order. The possibility of this order, of its reference, is 
this break, this spacing that renders time space and space time. The fact that 
photographs are omnipresent as representations, as objects or images, therefore, 
cannot simply keep them intact ‘Trom having an enigmatic point of inactuality, a 
strange stasis, the stasis of an arresC (Barthes, Camera Lucida 91), since this
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omnipresence is forever inhabited by an overwhelming absence. Since this 
absence is unfillable, as it were, the space that its effect is a disturbing expansion 
of cannot be brought to a closure, and photographs cannot be taken in the last 
instance to simply function in completing an imagined circle of presences, as 
simple mechanisms of substitution for lack or loss.
In seemingly preserving the presence of its referent, then, the photograph 
cannot escape from rendering impure “not the figure of what it represents (quite 
the converse) but its very existence” (Barthes, Camera Lucida 115). This very 
opposition between figure and existence, or the figural and the literal, on the other 
hand, does not seem to be able to stand erect. Conversely, it is in its very 
conflation of these two terms that photography comes to disrupt any conventional 
understanding of presence. Taking the Winter Garden Photograph to be the 
signature of his mother, therefore, it is understandable why Barthes should 
suggest that a disorder occupies the heart of all photography. For it is suddenly 
discovered that for a photograph to be a photograph, and better still, for a referent 
to be photographable, just like signatures, both “must have a repeatable, iterable, 
imitable form” and “must be able to detach itself from the present and singular 
intention of its production” (Derrida, “Signature” 327-8). The “condition of 
possibility of form,” of the photograph as well as of the referent, suddenly is 
discovered to lay in the labor of the trace, in iterability, interrupting the finality of 
notions like the “appropriate context” and “the so-called unity of voice” (Spivak 
99), that is, of presence-proper as it is usually conceived. It is in this sense that 
photography testifies to a “strictly revulsive moment which reverses the course of 
the thing"' (Barthes, Camera Lucida 119. Emphasis added.). It is in photography, 
then, that we find a particularly consistent embodiment of the notion of identity as
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not the straightforward converse of repetition, but as a consequence of the 
irreplaceable, irrefutable condition of the latter. In that, the questions raised in the 
identity of identity by the very existence of photography can be understood to 
seriously trouble it, and with it any assumption of pure self-presence. For 
photography identifies at the moment it alters, by repeating, the being of its 
referent. Neither, then, the self-presence of that being can be maintained as 
“infinitely repeatable as the same,” for in being repeated not only its present limits 
or context is violated but also its future occupation, nor “contexts that can be 
defined and transferred within firm outlines” (Spivak 86) honored, since those 
contexts irrelevant to the ‘original’ and into which the photograph and its referent 
as iterable entities are put ultimately fail to saturate the very process of their 
repetition. This is why every photograph is potentially endowed with a punctum, a 
violent fissure that wounds the hand that tries to reach through the photograph, 
taking the viewer out of the frame, to the territory of the blind, and offers a field 
of “a kind of subtle beyond -  as if the image launched desire beyond what it 
permits us to see” (Barthes, Camera Lucida 59). Photography’s undeniable but 
unapparent structural necessity, the “structural possibility of being severed from 
its referent or signified (and therefore from communication and its context),” 
simultaneous with its production of “the nonpresent remaining of a differential 
mark cut off from its alleged ‘production’ or origin” (Derrida, “Signatures” 318), 
therefore, does not only qualify it among other forms iteration, but renders it a 
very powerful and interesting corollary of the latter as well.
Barthes does not reproduce the Winter Garden Photograph in Camera 
Lucida, claiming that it would solely represent for the reader what he terms the 
studium in photography, and would present no wounds, no punctum. This
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reservation has usually been treated as an inadequacy on the part of Barthes by a 
host of commentators, some taking their claim to the degree of maintaining that 
no such photograph existed, that it was merely a ‘fiction’ set up by the grieving 
thinker. On the other hand, this act, it seems, could be another moment of Camera 
Lucida wherein Barthes acknowledges the very force of photography. Being 
himself an ‘illegitimate’ receiver of the photograph under question, for it had been 
generated at a time when the empirical presence of Barthes as its addressee had 
not been a possibility, it appears Barthes understands through it that each and 
every photograph, like the grapheme in general, should “remain legible despite 
the absolute despite the absolute disappearance of every determined addressee in 
general for it to function” (Derrida, “Signatures” 315). The exclusivity of the 
strange accord that this peculiar photograph establishes between Barthes and his 
mother that he wishes to render incomprehensible if not illegible for anyone else, 
by the very evidence of its coming to legibility for Barthes, remains a 
decipherable mark “that is iterable for a third party, and thus for any possible user 
in general” (Derrida, “Signature” 315). It is, however, because of Barthes’s 
reluctance to grant that the Winter Garden Photograph will remain legible 
infinitely, or for as long as the photograph lasts, that he seems to have felt the 
obligation to relate that “at the end of this first death"" {Camera Lucida 93. 
Emphasis added.), as the necessary component of the photograph’s life, his “own 
death is inscribed.” For it is the absence of the sender of the photograph, the 
absence of Barthes’s mother, and in general of any referent of any photograph 
‘Trom the marks that [s/]he abandons” that makes the photograph possible and 
which are bound to “continue to produce effects beyond his [or her] presence and 
beyond the present actuality of his [or her] meaning, that is, beyond his [or her]
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life itself’ (Derrida, “Signature” 313) that is at stake here. Barthes wishes this 
absence to come to an end, to render this absence finite through his own death, 
which will supposedly leave the punctum in the Winter Garden Photograph 
impenetrably obscure. On the other hand, not only his mother’s but Barthes’s 
death seems also to have been inscribed in this photograph. Further, as the 
receiver of all photography, Barthes extends this inscription, which it appears is 
the condition of all inscription, to mark every photograph. “It is because each 
photograph always contains this imperious sign of my future death that each one,” 
he relates, “however attached it seems to be to the excited world of the living, 
challenges each of us, one by one, outside any generality” (Camera Lucida 97). In 
other words, the challenge, the scandal or the punctum the photograph represents 
here in the face of the generality or the studium under the siege of which it is 
found turns out to be the figuration of the literal. Of the fact, that is, that 
photography, as its structural and irreducible necessity and like all pieces of 
wiriting, “must be able to function in the radical absence of every empirically 
determined addressee in general” (Derrida, “Signatures” 316). The strange 
character that qualifies the event of history for Benjmin also shares in this 
network of absences in that its imagistic retrieval “allows us to speak of our death 
before death;” that “one day we will no longer be here, or, rather, we will only be 
here the way we have always been here, as images” (Cadava 224). Before we can 
begin to relate absence and history with the photograph, however, let us pause to 
attend to the general framework in which Benjamin articulates the interaction 
between the age of technical reproducibility and the image.
The interruption brought about by what he terms reproductive technologies 
to an uncontested notion of presence is a primary theme for Benjamin in “The
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Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction.” In his discussion of the
withering of aura, Benjamin no doubt recognizes a difference that comes across
between the principle of the empirical presence of objects and the notion of
presence in general on the horizontal trajectory aura follows. What is violated, he
seems to suggest, is not so much the former per se but the latter, from which it can
nevertheless not be thought apart:
The situations into which the product of mechanical reproduction 
can be brought may not touch the actual work o f art, yet the quality 
o f its presence is always depreciated. This holds not only for the 
art work but also, for instance, for a landscape which passes in 
review before the spectator in a movie. In the case of the art object, 
a most sensitive nucleus -namely, its authenticity- is interfered 
with whereas no natural object is vulnerable on that score. The 
authenticity of a thing is the essence of all that is transmissible 
from its beginning, ranging from its substantive duration to its 
testimony to the history which it has experienced. Since the 
historical testimony rests on the authenticity, the former, too, is 
jeopardized by reproduction when substantive duration ceases to 
matter. And, what is really jeopardized when the historical 
testimony is affected is the authority o f the object. (Benjamin,
“Work of Art” 221. Emphasis added.)
Some associations that go beyond the well taken point that the notion of presence 
is endangered in the time of reproduction that Benjamin evokes here are worth 
noticing. In recognizing that the changes brought about by reproduction in the 
name of the reproduced differ along the lines of the separate positions objects take 
up in history and in society, Benjamin seems to suggest that the ways in which the 
authenticity of works of art and the authenticity of natural objects are negotiated 
are not the same. The quality-of-presence of the latter, nevertheless, is also 
interfered with when it is reproduced, since the time of mechanical reproduction is 
running against the very frame of time in which it would normally be found to 
exist. The time of mechanical reproduction, then, renders substantive duration 
irrelevant in case both of natural and cultural objects. It should perhaps be noted
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in passing that Benjamin’s suggestions here could thus be taken to mean that 
reproduction facilitates and thrives in the death of the reproduced. Let it suffice 
for the moment, however, to record that Benjamin appears somewhat equivocal in 
coming to terms with the ways in which natural objects are deprived of their 
authenticity. Since he notes that no natural object is vulnerable on that grounds, it 
seems reasonable to assume that Benjamin recognizes a difficulty in coming to 
terms with the depreciation of the authority of the natural here.
To turn to history-in-the-making and tradition: The problems an 
uncritically linear approach to history and historiography the time of 
reproducibility subjects to scrutiny are made evident in the formulation just 
alluded to. The referent’s, as it were, as well as the subject’s respective 
historiographies and modes of presence, it turns out, are put into danger. On the 
other hand, older modes of representation, when reconsidered in the age of 
reproducibility, are understood to have effectively veiled the ways in which either 
the referent or the subject could be understood to be ‘in the picture’ now. Barthes 
and Benjamin catch up with those ways differently in grabbing two diverse yet 
interrelated prongs of this rupture. Against the grain of his carnal, blatant 
inclusion in the photograph, Barthes wishes to “‘come out’ on paper as on a 
classical canvas, endowed with a noble expression -  thoughtful, intelligent, etc.!” 
crying for help from the residues of painting: “In short, if I could be ‘painted’ (by 
Titian) or drawn (by Clouet)!” {Camera Lucida 11). Benjamin, in emphasizing the 
notion of property in relation to photography, opposes the structure of testimony 
the camera is responsible for instituting with that of the testimony of the painting, 
asserting that although photography shares some “figures [that] had long been 
known in painting,” those figures laid claim in painting only “to the art of the
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painter” (“Photography” 242). The ownership of an object of art at the time when 
painting reigned, then, could come to mean the announcement of a possession of 
the skills of the artist, the endurance of originality. “[N]ow and then someone 
would ask after the originals ... [T]he pictures, if they last, do so only as a 
testimony to the art of the painter. With photography, however, we encounter 
something new and strange” (Benjamin, “History” 242). This something, it 
appears, concerns a novel inability to contain the referent unproblematically in art, 
or in ‘the code,’ as it were. Being, like film, a mode of “thoroughgoing 
permeation of reality with mechanical equipment,” and presenting a 
“representation of reality ... incomparably more significant than that of the 
painter” as much as film, the “thoroughgoing permeation of reality with 
mechanical equipment” (“Work of Art” 234) the photograph offers, however, 
differs from the infiltration film is responsible for instituting, and seems to render 
it distinct for Benjamin. His claim that is to be found inflicting his discussion 
every time photography is in focus, that photography should be considered in 
connection to science, that it thrives in “[t]he stripping bare of the object” 
(“Photography” 250), does certainly remind one of the irretrievability of the 
structuralist insistence that we leave knowledge of the being of objects (referents) 
to “‘experts’ such as physicists and philosophers” (Kirby 24). Further, while the 
“Work of Art” essay can be followed to devote much thought on how filmic 
production and reception can be understood to institute equivalent procedures, in 
that the film expects its audience to perform in much the same way as the camera 
and the montage table does, adding together what it fragments according to new 
laws, no such suggestion of a receptive ‘culture’ accompanies Benjamin’s 
discussion of photography. While it is this strange, somewhat illusory but
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nevertheless material system that overwhelms the reception of film, rendering it 
able to offer “an aspect of reality which is free of all equipment” (“Work of Art” 
234), the same statement does not seem to stand entirely verifiable for 
photography. Reluctant to give in to the ‘skill’ of the artist, at least in its entirety, 
the body of the subject of photography endures the action of the photograph in 
surviving it. ‘It is there,’ although it is not quite: what is (un)certain is that it is not 
unproblematically here. Never hitherto have representation problematized 
presentation as densely, one expects to hear someone utter, as Benjamin relates of 
his favorite photograph:
In Hill’s Newhaven fishwife, her eyes cast down in such indolent, 
seductive modesty, there remains something that goes beyond 
testimony to the photographer’s art, something that cannot be 
silenced, that fills you with an unruly desire to know what her 
name was, the woman who was alive there, who even now is still 
real and will never consent to be wholly absorbed in art.
(“Photography” 242-3)
But why should this desire that Benjamin is burning with be unruly? Its object, 
indeed, appears quite impossible, out of reach. Elsewhere Benjamin offered that 
photographic reproduction “enables the original to meet the beholder halfway'^ 
(“Work of Art” 220. Emphasis added.). Since it is halfway between the gutter and 
the stars, photography could, it seems, be defined by an inability as much as it can 
be announced to be enabling. And there turns up to be more to this inability of 
absorption. “The associative mechanisms in the beholder,” it appears, are prone to 
being paralyzed through exposition to images defined by “fleeting and secret 
moments” (“Photography” 256) and which therefore cannot quiet be ‘taken-up’ 
easily on the side of the viewer. The evidential powers the photograph bears to 
view are, at least eventually, as strong even as to resist circumscription by a 
caption. Benjamin thinks that not many of the critics of photography are aware of
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this: It is “[o]ne thing ... both Wiertz and Baudelaire failed to grasp: the lessons
inherent in the authenticity of the photograph. These cannot be forever
circumvented by a commentary whose clichés merely establish verbal
associations in the viewer” (“Photography” 256). These lessons, it emerges, have
something to teach about history and historiography. The teaching, on the other
side, is not always as apparent as it is in the few pictures Benjamin considers,
where it is hard to miss. If we ‘immerse’ ourselves in those photographic events
he has in mind, we most certainly
will recognize how alive the contradictions are, here too: the most 
precise technology can give its products a magical value, such as a 
painted picture can never again have for us. No matter how artful 
the photographer, no matter how carefully posed his subject, the 
beholder feels an irresistible urge to search such a picture for the 
tiny spark of contingency, of the Here and Now, with which reality 
has so to speak seared the subject, to find the inconspicuous spot 
where in the immediacy of that long-forgotten moment the future 
subsists so eloquently that we, looking back, may rediscover it. For 
it is another nature that speaks to the camera than to the eye: other 
in the sense that a space informed by human consciousness gives 
way to a space informed by the unconscious. (“Photography” 243)
The contradictions are as visible if not more obviously emergent when the 
photograph that confronts the subject features his/her own. The problem, further, 
is precisely one that concerns the subject’s notion of integrity. “This disturbance,” 
says Roland Barthes, “is ultimately one of ownership” {Camera Lucida 13). A 
significant characteristic of photography that renders it novel in a striking way, 
then, is buried in Benjamin’s recognition: “To see oneself (differently from a 
mirror): on the scale of History ...” (Barthes, Camera Lucida 12). Barthes 
considers it as important as to call it ‘a disturbance to civilization’ {Camera 
Lucida 12). The subject being photographed, much like the subject viewing the 
photograph, is struck by a “sensation of inauthenticity” (Barthes, Camera Lucida
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13). This sensation, however, is not carried as straightforwardly as Barthes’s 
definition of the emotions he goes through as he discovers what befalls him as he 
is photographed seems to suggest: “what I see is that I have become Total-Image, 
which is to say. Death in person;” ‘in my photographic-image-mode,’ Barthes 
seems to suggest, others -  the Other -  do not dispossess me of myself, they turn 
me, ferociously, into an object, they put me at their mercy, at their disposal, 
classified in a file, ready for the subtlest deceptions” {Camera Lucida 14). Neither 
can Barthes manage to put photographs at his own mercy, nor the mode he has in 
mind seem to be restricted solely to being photographed and photograph, as is 
evident in his rapturous description of the procedure through which he becomes
so:
In terms of image-repertoire, the Photograph (the one I intend) 
represents that very subtle moment when, to tell the truth, I am 
neither subject nor object but a subject who feels he is becoming 
an object: I then experience a micro-version of death (of 
parenthesis): I am truly becoming a specter. {Camera Lucida 14)
What is worth noting, without necessarily emphasizing the sometimes 
phenomenological language that Barthes considers the relationship between 
intention and object, is that the ‘photograph with a capital p’ for Barthes 
designates in Camera Lucida the ones that exist for him: those in which he 
recognizes particularly effective the irreducible opening of a door for the intention 
of the viewing subject. What Barthes advances here in terms of being 
photographed, it seems, can therefore be extended to all photography, and be 
taken to mean that no photographic experience manages to sidestep the 
contradictions and excitements of temporal-spatial dislocation. Thus, the observer 
can be said to suffer from the parenthetical spectralization Barthes has in mind 
here as much the observed, caught in a form of ecstatic reaction. “For the
111
Photograph,” in any case, “is the advent of myself as other” (Barthes, Camera 
Lucida 12). A usually overlooked fact is that this process of ‘othering’ seldom 
comes to complete halt, and it should perhaps be noted that Benjamin’s remarks 
on fascism’s response to photography and film concerns precisely a full blown 
attempt to petrify this very process. Its practice consists in producing images in 
which ‘“the amorphous mass’ could find a face and a voice that it might call its 
own, or if not its own, that it could at least recognize and use to secure its own 
position” (Weber 101). According to the suggestive remarks Barthes devotes to 
this problem that concerns the uncanny nature of the process wherein recognition 
sets in, however, the alterability involved in the photographic experience leaves 
the subject stripped bare of the ability to readily recognize himself or herself in 
the photograph. This lack on the subject’s part, Barthes warns, although most 
operational when the photograph viewed features the viewer, cannot be simply 
restricted: “today it is as if we repressed profound madness of photography: it 
reminds us of its m)dhic heritage only by that faint uneasiness which seizes me 
when I look at ‘myself on a piece of paper” {Camera Lucida, 13).
It would perhaps be necessary to acknowledge at this point that part of the 
reasons why Benjamin salutes surrealism in “Work of Art” as elsewhere concerns 
this very process by which the perceptive mechanism which encourages the 
viewer to recognize things as-they-are is interfered with. The progressive 
“achievements that surrealist photography” could breach the ground for consist in 
registering, offering and allowing for “a salutary estrangement between man and 
his surroundings” (Benjamin, “Photography” 251). Through its practical 
reluctance to value and put forward anything ‘intimate,’ any image in which 
estrangement goes unnoticed and recognition is rendered a continuous possibility.
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and by its emphasis “on the illumination of detail,” “[i]t gives free play to the 
politically educated eye (Benjamin, “Photography” 251). This peculiarity is not 
exclusive to surrealism. “The enlargement of a snapshot” also “reveals entirely 
new structural formations of the subject,” rather than “simply render more precise 
what in any case was visible, though unclear” (Benjamin, “Work of Art” 236). 
What is at stake appears to concern a process of discernment, inaugurating 
latently, and operating in contradistinction to first-hand recognition. Early 
photography, Benjamin recognizes, stood as an empirical evidence of this 
characteristic: photographs, then, “had to be turned this way and that until, in the 
proper light, a pale grey image could be discerned” (“Photography” 242). This 
“ghostly or spectral character” of early photography defines for Benjamin what 
stands against the brightness of the magazine picture (Cadava 226).
The significance of what he terms ‘surrealist photography’ for 
understanding the political subsistence of photography-in-general engenders a 
new dynamic for Walter Benjamin in the case of Eugene Atget. Atget’s 
photographs “demand a specific kind of approach; free-floating contemplation is 
not appropriate to them. They stir the viewer; he feels challenged by them in a 
new way” (Benjamin, “Work of Art” 226). And it is precisely because of the 
introduction of the possibility of the agitated viewer with these photographs that 
captions are deemed necessary accompaniments for photographs. Taking the 
viewers to be stumbling at this stirred state, illustrated magazines respond to the 
new politics of interrupted recognition the photograph facilitates by putting up 
‘signposts’ for them, in order to be able to present them with ‘directives.’ In 
understanding the caption to be effectively parasitic on the photograph, Benjamin
The enlargement Benjamin alludes to here seems to bring to mind the action of the ‘politically 
educated eye’ rather than solely the technical process hy which images are hlown-up.
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thus recognizes here a fundamental difference between photography and film. The 
directives that attempt to repress the politically educated eye that confronts the 
photograph, it turns out, occupy the very heart of filmic reception: those edicts 
“which the captions give to those looking at pictures in illustrated magazines soon 
become even more explicit and more imperative in the film where the meaning of 
each single picture appears to be prescribed by the sequence of all preceding 
ones” (“Work of Art” 226) . But there remains in this distinction something that 
this characteristic does not quite manage to testify to in and of its own, and which 
concerns photography’s acquisition of a hidden political significance. Benjamin 
becomes conscious of a peculiarly photographic operation hitherto unrealized and 
which becomes evident with
the incomparable significance of Atget, who, around 1900, took 
photographs of deserted Paris streets. It has quite justly been said 
of him that he photographed them like scenes of crime. The scene 
of a crime, too, is deserted; it is photographed for the purpose of 
establishing evidence. With Atget, photographs become standard 
evidence for historical occurrences, and acquire a hidden political 
significance. (“Work of Art” 226)
What demands attention in Benjamin’s treatment of Atget and the novelty which 
his photographs bring out is his focus on the posthumous. Benjamin seems here to 
put forward on the evidential nature of photography does not only concern the 
‘this was,’ the moment of the image’s origin, but also the realm of the past 
perfect, the ‘that had been.’ Providing traces of traces, reaching out to the anterior 
of the posterior, Atget’s photographs lay claim to the truth of the fact after-the- 
fact, suggesting a narrative that is difficult to trace but nevertheless laden with
In “The Third Meaning,” Roland Bardies aptly demonstrates this principle by focusing on film 
stills more or less independently of the narrative they normally belong to. See also “Right of 
Inspection,” where Derrida sets up a polylogue of voices that do not come to an agreement on 
whether such an operation is possible.
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traces that can neither be effaced nor petrified . Not only, therefore, the ‘here- 
and-now’ is conflated with the ‘there-then,’ but the ‘here-and-now’ of the past is 
also incorporated with that of the domain of the past-perfect. The time of 
reproducibility, “this ‘posthumously shocked’, immobilized, dispersed, 
recollected and finally forgotten moment” (Weber 100), then, does not quite allow 
for a linear and complete history, and less for a present that can be fully grasped. 
What it does rather concerns arresting, separating, and reproducing “the ‘here- 
and-now’ again and again in a proliferating series of images which go here and 
there,” allowing for a slippage of “a mass of pictures that cannot keep still even if 
they are instantaneous ‘snapshots’” (Weber 100). No wonder, then, in this world 
“on the verge, traversed and indeed constituted out of such circulating series of 
images” (Weber 100), the aura of artworks as well of objects is set out on a route 
to disappearance whose trajectory complicates any conventional understanding of 
being and history. For the evidence that ‘the spark of contingency’ Benjamin has 
in mind lays claim to culminates in a “point of fissure of the image: it prevents it 
from closing up, from hiding behind the appearance of historical continuity or 
organic interrelatedness” (Abbas 58).
28
^  Perhaps a connection that is hard to miss but that cannot be fully spelled out within the confines 
of tíiis study should be alluded to here. It would be remembered that Benjamin insists on an 
enigmatic coupling, ‘lanconscious optics,’ whenever he establishes the characteristics of 
photography as reproductive technology. Beside the manifest understanding of ‘unconcious optics’ 
as tire frame in which Benjamin introduces the fragmentary or fetishistic nature of photographic 
images, a new link can be suggested between the workings of the psyche and of reproducive 
technology as Benjamin understands them. In “Freud and the Scene of Writing,” Jacques Derrida 
seems to salute the emphasis put on the mystic writing pad as a model for the work of the psychic 
apparatus by Freud, who in his earlier studies understood the psyche to work in an optical manner. 
The scene Derrida has in mind, however, appears to be very much like die scene of crime 
Benjamin alludes to here, in that it is a scene which allows for the old trace and the new trace to 
exist interdependantly and effectively. At least three oppositions, then, can be taken to be put at 
stake here: new/old, word/image, conscious/unconscious. Benjamin puts emphasis at this stake 
elsewhere: “To the form of the new means of production, which to begin with is still dominated by 
the old (Marx), there correspond images in the collective consciousness in which the new and the 
old are intermingled” (“Fourier or the Arcades” 159).
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4 CONCLUSION: HISTORY AND PHOTOGRAPHY
One aspect of the ‘illusory ’ world-picture the thinkers reviewed in the second 
chapter of this study argue is by definition held steadfast between the subject and 
the ‘real world’ through photographs is that it is inconceivable without the 
introduction of the shadow: “As soon as there is a technology of the image, 
visibility brings night” (Derrida, “Spectrographies” 115). In undermining the 
shadow and through participating in the maintenance of an uncritical notion of the 
history of art and of technology, however, the thinkers under consideration seem 
to have treated the camera obscura and photography on equivalent grounds, 
stressing that since the former bears the same unity of the world-picture, the latter, 
as the uncomplicated follower of the former, is also “a field of projection 
corresponding to the space of Descartes’s mathesis universalis, in which all 
objects of thought ... can be ordered and compared” (Crary 56). Such inadequacy 
on the part of the ‘postmodern critique of photography’ motivated the trajectory of 
the discussion advanced here to take a turn toward the work on photography of 
Roland Barthes, who declared that his intention was to elucidate the ‘mathesis 
singularis’ involved in the production of photography and to distinguish the 
floating light of the camera lucida from the ‘illuminating’ totality of the camera 
obscura. The ‘spooky,’ shadowy nature of that light have thus comprised an 
important part of the discussion and made it canalize its focus to the relationship 
between the ‘real world’ and the specter. Its sudden nature, however, remains to
II6
be speculated on, particularly as it relates to event of history. The parallels 
between that event and the age of technical reproduction, that is, the rupture the 
technology of the image is responsible for attenuating, will be occupying the 
center of the arguments that are to follow.
The withering of the artwork’s aura that Benjamin locates at the heart of 
the age of technological reproducibility have been the source of much debate and 
varied articulations on history and technology. What is important to notice, 
however, seems to be that in the framework Benjamin sketches, it is not “aura as 
such but the aura of art as a work of representation, a work that would have its 
fixed place, that would take its place in and as a world-picture” that is interfered 
with in the age of technical reproducibility (Weber 107). In that, technical 
reproducibility resembles another concept that demands attention in the thought of 
Benjamin. Products of technological reproducibility, photographs prominent 
among them, seem to operate in a way that is reminiscent of the ‘dialectical 
image.’ The historical index peculiar to the latter strikes the subject and the 
viewer of history, like the reproductive image, as a shock that tends to violate the 
continuity of tradition.
The parallels between Benjamin’s concept of history and method of 
historiography and his understanding of the event of photography are elsewhere 
articulated with thoroughness^^. Whereas it would be possible to take those 
parallels to mean that Benjamin’s method of historiography is ‘photographic,’ the 
discussion presented here attempts to understand Benjamin’s suggestions on the 
fascination and the politics of the photographic image to complement his 
understanding of history.
For instances of arguments that put those parallels at the heart of their sugeestions See Abbas,; 
Cadava; Haverkamp; and Dant and Gilloch.
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Benjamin pictures the ‘angel’ of history as one whose “face is turned 
toward the past” and who sees in the spectacle history pushes in his face “one 
single catastrophe which keeps piling wreckage upon wreckage and hurls it in 
front of his feet” (Benjamin, “Theses on the Philosophy of History” [hereafter 
“Thesis”] 257). This angel, as the true historian, aims to “awaken the dead, and 
make whole of what has been smashed” (Benjamin, “Thesis” 257). But the storm 
of progress, of which that does not want to stay, that does not want to admit any 
living-on or legibility in any kind of the trace that does not fit into a historicist 
continuum, keeps the angel from being able to do so. In the meantime, “the pile of 
debris before him grows skyward” (Benjamin, “Thesis” 257-8). The technology of 
the image, of the photographic image in particular, however, seems to bring to 
view in an irrefutable way precisely the traces that make up that pile. In that, the 
modernity with which it is usually associated could better be understood as one 
that increases the power of the ghost rather than simply efface it.
In Specters, a project that is undertaken in the effort to deconstruct 
approaches to history that treat the catastrophic historical event as mere mistakes 
in a trajectory that will nevertheless reach the closure it is supposedly destined for 
-  approaches, in other words, ‘of the Fukuyama type’ - ,  Jacques Derrida posits 
the specter as an ‘entity’ that is irreducibly iterable and thus troubling to such 
approaches. The specter
carries life beyond present life or its actual being-there, its 
empirical or ontological actuality: not toward death but toward a 
living-on [...] namely, a trace of which life and death would 
themselves be but traces and traces of traces, a survival whose 
possibility in advance comes to disjoin or dis-adjust the identity of 
itself of the living present as well as of any effectivity. (Derrida,
Specters xx)
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Like the angel of history that marks the traces of disappearance, the specter, who 
pays a visit only when it is “past midnight, bitterly cold, and dark except for the 
faint light of the stars” {Hamlet 164), is the trace of that which cannot come to the 
‘light of the (present) day,’ but whose being complicates that very light. It is 
“beyond therefore the living present in general” (Derrida, Specters xx. Italics 
omitted.). Similarly, although what the photograph photographs is necessarily no 
longer present or living in the proper sense at the time of its being viewed, its 
having-been-there now forms a referential structure. By definition, therefore, it 
“takes the form of a haunting” (Cadava 224). The index of the photographic 
image, then, can be conceived as doubtfully dualistic: it consists of the recognition 
of a past time to which the image ‘belongs’ as well as the time it becomes legible. 
But since this image is one that comes only to pass and passes only to come back, 
the time of legibility of the photograph is necessarily extensive, and therefore the 
history of its readability is by definition incomplete: it renders the context of the 
photograph’s reading forever insaturable. Unlike historicism, which “gives the 
‘eternal’ image of the past” (Benjamin, “Thesis” 262), it does not allow for a 
present that can be defined in absolute contemporaneity with itself
The linear passage of time with which historicism is concerned, then, 
cannot stand erect in the presence of the photographic image, which collapses the 
past, the present, and the future under a single framework, producing a rupture in 
the ‘natural’ extinction of generations. History in this sense arises less from the 
enactment of time than from the ability to read the image that interrupts such a 
passage. The specter “strikes a blow at the teleological order of history” in a 
similar vein: “What is coming, in which the untimely appears, is happening to 
time but it does not happen in time” (Derrida, Specters 77). The emanation of
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historiography in this framework are therefore bound to the survival of the trace 
and of on the willingness on the part of the subject to understand the trace, as 
trace. In Benjamin’s understanding of it, “there can be no history without the 
Medusa effect, without the capacity to arrest or immobilize historical movement, 
to isolate the detail of an event from the continuum of history” (Cadava 230-1). It 
is here that we find that the experience of shock occupies the heart of photography 
as a formal principle: in the irreducible delay inscribed in the reception of even 
the most ‘immediate’ photograph. Its frequency does not render what is absent 
‘properly’ present, but produces a “non-presence” that “demands that one takes its 
times and history into consideration, the singularity of its temporality” (Derrida, 
Specters 101).
It is therefore not for simple reasons that Walter Benjamin, who “regards 
it as his task to brush history against the grain” (“Thesis” 257) and to appreciate 
the “constellation which his own era has formed with a definite earlier one” 
(“Thesis” 263), recognizes the photograph as a structurally new object whose 
patterns of legibility demands careful attention from the intellectual^^. For the 
agency of the latter in the face of the historical event comes into play when he or 
she utilizes an authority that targets to dissociate the image to be read from its 
context rather than strive to preserve or extend the latter. Historical legibility is 
advanced when the concern of the reader is dense enough to breach the 
appurtenance of an image, and the development of the photographic plate can then 
begin to move toward historical significance. Once that development is 
undertaken, however, it does not know of a complete stop: the standstills wherein 
it will be found come always to pass.
' See “The Author as Producer” on this point.
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This study took off by stating the dangers involved in approaching 
photography on the grounds solely of its inclination to ‘illusion’ and ‘oppression.’ 
It tried instead to suggest ways of introducing concepts to the theory of 
photography that can emphasize the productive aspects of the latter. This stance 
required that the discussion advanced here paid more attention to the discourse of 
photography rather than the discourse in the photograph; that the troubling 
‘existence’ of the photograph is posited at the center of its arguments; and that 
certain concepts which can be understood to surround photography’s makeup 
were brought into the framework. Consequently, a consideration of photography 
and power was ranked lower than a discussion of photography as power. Stress on 
the identity of photography, therefore, was taken to be a necessary component of 
the discussion. That identity, however, is widely believed to be put under danger 
with the introduction of ‘digital’ imaging techniques to the world of photography.
The identity of photography has been related in the preceding chapters 
with the series of material contiguities that photographs are capable of bringing 
into play. As an ‘emanation of the referent,’ the experience of the photograph has 
been taken to ‘really’ involve the substantial as well as the intelligible, and to 
concern nature as much as culture. That this involvement, however, was bound to 
the principle of the absence rather than the presence of the referent of the 
photograph was also pointed out: the light of photography resembles less the 
‘broad’ light of the day than the flickering spark of the star, necessarily dead at the 
moment of the reception of its glow. Further, the question of whether this 
flickering has always been a necessity of the inscription of the “possibility of the 
reference to the other, and thus of radical alterity and heterogeneity, of difference, 
of technicity, and of ideality in the very event of presence” (Derrida, Specters 75)
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was also alluded to. In this context, the observation that the photograph is at the 
verge of becoming the product of a stream of electronic data rather than a series of 
analogous but untimely contacts between the photographed and the viewer should 
indeed be taken to comprise a rupture in its identity. Whereas the rupture 
concerned seems usually to be understood within the context of the presumed 
demise of photography’s capabilities of truth-production, the space of the 
arguments gathered here demands rather that such capabilities are received 
critically in analogue or digital photography alike.
It does not seem to be an inhabitable position to suggest that the privileged 
position of photography among other systems of representation as a more accurate 
carrier of truth has nothing to do with its mode of production. With the fact, that 
is, that photographs operate with referents not optionally but necessarily real. The 
question of whether the ‘photographic look’ is home out of the awareness of the 
viewer of its mode of production or not, however, cannot be met with a fruitful 
answer. In either way, computer generated images that could refer nothing else 
than to a bank of digital data are today extremely capable of producing that look. 
The affect that is peculiar to the reception of photographs and that is immediately 
tied to the apprehension on the side of the subject of the way photographs are 
produced, on the other hand, seems to have been leaving the field of retrieval of 
the latter. This does not mean that the contemporary situation wherein it is very 
feasible and commonplace to ‘fake’ photographs is entirely alien to the sphere in 
which they have functioned. The specter can always be the incarnation of an evil 
spirit that is faking it through yet another disguise of visual presence. It is 
precisely the agency of faith in the ghost on the part of the visited, who are 
obliged to swear on the subject of the apparition as soon as it appears and
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disappears, that makes it the ghost of some ‘thing.’ The specter neverthless is 
capable of producing work, of concern and of responsibility even in its evil form. 
None of the characters in Hamlet ‘knows,’ for example, whether the ghost of 
Hamlet’s father is what it claims or is claimed to be. Yet this does not keep that 
ghost from stealing the center-stage of the play. And this is where, it seems, the 
photograph does not always share the authority of the specter, whose effect 
necessarily “corresponds ... to a position ... of the ghost, a dialectical position of 
the ghostly body as body proper” (Derrida, Specters 128).
Whereas the photograph promises “a dynamic temporal depth beneath its 
calm static surface, digital images fascinate by overtly abandoning any such 
claim” (Batchen, “Carnal Knowledge” 22). In that, they do not seem to the viewer 
to resist the lure of the simulacrum-in-general. In other words, the digital 
photographic image, or the image in general in the time of the digital image, does 
not take a turn to look at the viewer in its passage: it passes to pass, not to 
eventually come back. Similarly, unlike the photographic plate which is either 
saved or discarded, the system of production of the digital image does not defy 
cases where the material it is made up of is reinscribed with other data. The digital 
image, consequently, does not cling on the viewer and push its concern on the 
face of the subject, since the latter is prone to approach it with doubt. Therefore it 
actually comes to share the contemporary faith of many photographs. Put more 
appropriately, it seems that what the possibility of the digital photograph 
contributes to and correlates with are the ways in which the aggravation 
photography is responsible for is dealt with culturally. This aspect of the way 
photographs are installed in contexts of reception that are hard to neglect accounts 
also for the observation that not every photograph is endowed with a punctum in
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every case. The singularity involved, on the other hand, conies by no means to 
mean that the viewer’s capabilities of acknowledging his or her asynchronous 
relationship to photographs and to their existence can be simply and completely 
concealed through the labor of the associations photographs are made part of as 
they are ‘lost’ amidst the plentitude of simulacra. Rather, it reminds us that, 
potentially, an irreducible spark of contingency that occupies the heart of the 
production and reproduction of the photographic event always threatens to 
become the viewer’s concern.
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